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ABSTRACT 
As automation supplants more forms of labor, creative expression still seems 
like a distinctly human enterprise.  This may someday change: by ingesting works 
of authorship as “training data,” computer programs can teach themselves to write 
natural prose, compose music, and generate movies.  Machine learning is an 
artificial intelligence (“AI”) technology with immense potential and a 
commensurate appetite for copyrighted works.  In the United States, the copyright 
law mechanism most likely to facilitate machine learning’s uses of protected data is 
the fair use doctrine.  However, current fair use doctrine threatens either to derail 
the progress of machine learning or to disenfranchise the human creators whose 
work makes it possible. 
This Article addresses the problem in three Parts: using popular machine 
learning datasets and research as case studies, Part I describes how programs 
“learn” from corpora of copyrighted works and catalogs the legal risks of this 
practice.  It concludes that fair use may not protect expressive machine learning 
applications, including the burgeoning field of natural language generation.  Part 
II explains that applying today’s fair use doctrine to expressive machine learning 
will yield one of two undesirable outcomes:  if U.S. courts reject the fair use 
defense for machine learning, valuable innovation may move to another 
jurisdiction or halt entirely; alternatively, if courts find the technology to be fair 
use, sophisticated software may divert rightful earnings from the authors of input 
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data.  This dilemma shows that fair use may no longer serve its historical purpose.  
Traditionally, fair use is understood to benefit the public by fostering expressive 
activity.  Today, the doctrine increasingly serves the economic interests of powerful 
firms at the expense of disempowered individual rights holders.  Finally, in Part 
III, this Article contemplates changes in doctrine and policy that could address 
these problems.  It concludes that the United States’ interest in avoiding both 
prongs of AI’s fair use dilemma offers a novel justification for redistributive 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Uno no es lo que es por lo que escribe, sino por lo que ha leído.”1 
 
It is the year 2017, and artificial intelligence (“AI”) is in vogue.  Technology 
that promises to boost productivity, fight wars, replace human labor, and perhaps 
even precipitate humankind’s demise has captivated engineers, policymakers, 
academics, artists, and the general public.2  Copyright scholars have been eager to 
get in on the action.  The fast-growing body of legal scholarship on AI and 
copyright tends to focus on one question:  what happens when computers produce 
outputs that resemble conventional, expressive works of art by human creators, 
such as musical compositions, images, poetry, and prose—do these “works” have 
“authors?”3  “Can a computer be an author?” is an enticing query because it raises 
deep questions about the nature of creativity, autonomy, and human expression. 
This question, though more popular than ever, is not as novel as it may seem.4  
Over a century has passed since the Supreme Court first evaluated whether the 
outputs of a new creative technology, capable of operating with less human 
oversight than its predecessors, could manifest authorship to the degree intellectual 
property laws required.5  That technology was photography; courts asked the same 
questions of video games in the early 1980’s,6 and intellectual property scholars 
have been pondering for at least thirty years whether a computer program can be an 
 
 1. “One is not what he has written, but what he has read.” Jorge Luis Borges, quoted in Gideon 
Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/SBQ9-K899; but 
see Talk: Jorge Luis Borges, WIKIQUOTE, https://perma.cc/2Z84-MQXD (last visited July 29, 2017) 
(noting that the quotation is unsourced). 
 2. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE 
ECONOMY (2016), available at https://perma.cc/5WN8-5UMD; NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: 
PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 115 (2014); Stuart Russell, Daniel Dewey & Max Tegmark, Research 
Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence, 36 AI MAG. 105, 112–13 (2015). 
 3. See, e.g., Bruce E. Boyden, Emergent Works, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 378 (2015); 
Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 5 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. (2012); William Ralston, Copyright in Computer-Composed Music: Hal Meets Handel, 52 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 281 (2005); Pamela Samuelson, The Future of Software Protection: Allocating 
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986). 
 4. See James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work - and It’s a 
Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L & ARTS 403, 403 (2016). 
 5. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); see also infra Mere 
Machinery. 
 6. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Intern., Inc., 704 F. 2d 1009, 1011 (7d Cir. 1983) (“There is a 
second difficulty that must be overcome if video games are to be classified as audiovisual works.…The 
question is whether the creative effort in playing a video game is enough like writing or painting to 
make each performance of a video game the work of the player and not the game’s inventor.”); see also 
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F. 2d 878, 879-80, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing, but ultimately 
rejecting, the theory that the audiovisual displays in a video game are uncopyrightable because they are 
created by the game’s player, not by its author). 
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“author” for the purposes of copyright.7  Moreover, even after all these years, it is 
not clear that the question of computer authorship is relevant to any real-world 
facts:  James Grimmelmann noted in 2015 that “no one has ever exhibited even one 
work that could plausibly claim to have a computer for an ‘author’ in the sense that 
the Copyright Act uses the term.”8 
It is not surprising that so much discussion of AI and copyright law focuses on 
the question of authorship.  Indeed, it reflects the fascination with individual, 
mythic authors that is an entrenched—and rightly criticized—flaw of copyright 
jurisprudence more generally.9  That this emphasis is unsurprising makes it no less 
unfortunate.  Just as collaboration and creative influence deserve more 
consideration in discussions of human authorship, so too do these concepts deserve 
more consideration in the analysis of artificial intelligence and copyright law.10  
This is because today’s cutting-edge technology requires potential AI authors to 
first be readers. 
While computers capable of authorship—if they exist—remain few and far 
between, artificial intelligence is now consuming copyrighted works at a 
tremendous pace.  Much as human creators learn from the works of their human 
predecessors, a technology called “machine learning” allows today’s AI to emulate 
works of human authorship after being provided with many examples.  Depending 
on the data on which it is trained, an AI could learn to generate prose, paintings, 
motion pictures, musical compositions, and so on.  These “training data” often 
comprise thousands of unauthorized copies of copyrighted works, which are 
reduplicated and modified countless more times throughout the training process. 
Massive, computerized reproduction of copyrighted works is not, in itself, a new 
legal issue.  Google Images and Google Books are services powered by the 
unauthorized copying of protected expression, and both have been excused by the 
fair use doctrine.  But applications like these have been found non-infringing 
largely because they do not purport to be expressive works in themselves and do 
not resemble copyright’s traditional subject matter.11  The jurisprudence on these 
computerized copyists tends to treat them as mere processors of existing expression 
that assemble many individual works into non-expressive, factual “reference 
tool[s].”12  New applications of machine learning, which use expressive works to 
teach AI expressive skills in order to generate new works, change this reasoning. 
 
 7. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 5 (1966), available at https://perma.cc/5VYM-RNZD; see also Samuelson, supra note 3. 
 8. Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 403. 
 9. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (1991); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective 
Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 294 (1992); see also Michel Foucault, What Is an 
Author?, THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF THEORY AND CRITICISM 1622 (Donald F. Bouchard & Sherry 
Simon trans., 2001) (discussing problems with overemphasizing an author-figure in literary criticism). 
 10. See, e.g., Giancarlo F. Frosio, A History of Aesthetics from Homer to Digital Mash-ups: 
Cumulative Creativity and the Demise of Copyright Exclusivity, 9 LAW HUMAN. 262, 263 (2015). 
 11. See James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657, 665 (2015). 
 12. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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Copyright law forces artificial intelligence into a binary:  it is either a mystical 
author or a dumb machine.  State-of-the-art machine learning is not exactly either.  
This is a lacuna in the scholarship, and the present Article fills it.  Part I describes 
how machine learning works, and why it may not be able to rely on fair use to 
excuse the reproduction and analysis of copyrighted works that it entails.  Part II 
describes how expressive machine learning13 poses a dilemma for the fair use 
doctrine:  broadly speaking, neither of the two outcomes the doctrine can reach 
appears equitable or desirable.  This dilemma shows that fair use may no longer 
serve its historical purpose.  Traditionally, fair use is understood to benefit the 
public by fostering expressive activity.  Today, the doctrine increasingly serves the 
economic interests of powerful firms at the expense of disempowered, individual 
rights holders.  Finally, Part III contemplates how today’s copyright doctrine might 
be used to promote distributive equity in the AI age. 
I. FAIR USE MAY NOT EXCUSE MACHINE LEARNING 
Technological innovation fosters new and valuable uses of copyrighted works:  
search engines index trillions of webpages, images, and videos; translation services 
use text from all over the internet to improve their fidelity; news aggregators direct 
readers to important stories written by third parties.  These uses often take place 
without rights holders’ explicit authorization, and, for this reason, depend on 
exceptions and limitations to copyright law.  The most prominent of these 
limitations is the fair use doctrine, set forth in § 107 of the Copyright Act.  Many 
technologies owe their existence to a successful fair use defense.14  Others owe 
their demise to a failed fair use defense.15  Fair use has yet to assess machine 
learning, and the doctrine could make or break the technology’s future. 
To adjudicate fair use, judges apply a four-factor standard that evaluates:  “(1) 
the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used; (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 16   The doctrine is 
 
 13. “Expressive machine learning,” an important term in this Article, is difficult to define 
precisely.  This is largely because “expression” itself is difficult to define and delimit.  Human 
expression takes infinitely many forms and can be embodied in countless distinct media; the United 
States copyright statute acknowledges that protectable expression may be “fixed in any tangible medium 
… now known or later developed, from which [the work] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated[.]” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (West 2017).  In addition to the hazy nature of expression, the 
breadth of potential applications of machine learning makes “expressive machine learning” still harder 
to define.  For the purposes of this Article, the term can be understood to refer to machine learning that 
trains on the expressive aspects of works, in order to fulfill an expressive purpose.  Determining the 
exact legal boundaries of expressiveness in the artificial intelligence context will likely fall to courts in 
the coming years. 
 14. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an 
image search engine’s unauthorized reproductions of copyrighted photographs are excused by fair use). 
 15. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDIGI Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that 
fair use does not excuse a secondhand marketplace for digital sound recordings from liability for 
infringement). 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2017). 
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notoriously protean; today, the most important consideration is whether or not a use 
is “transformative.”  In a 1990 article, Judge Pierre Leval outlined the canonical 
definition of transformativeness: 
The use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner 
or for a different purpose from the original.  A quotation of copyrighted material that 
merely repackages or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test; in Justice 
Story’s words, it would merely “supersede the objects” of the original.  If, on the other 
hand, the secondary use adds value to the original — if the quoted matter is used as 
raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new 
insights and understandings — this is the very type of activity that the fair use 
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.17 
The Supreme Court adopted Judge Leval’s transformativeness test four years 
later.18  Other considerations, such as a use’s effect on the potential market for the 
work used, still influence a fair use defense.  But transformativeness is the 
weightiest factor, and “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding 
of fair use.”19 
Transformative fair use protects some of machine learning’s precursor 
technologies, and many people doubtless assume it will shield machine learning, 
too.  However, this Part argues that certain applications of machine learning may 
not be excused by fair use.  First, it briefly documents copyright’s historical 
tendency to treat mechanical processes as separate from protectable expression.  It 
then explains how this view of machinery has informed a doctrine of “non-
expressive” fair use, which permits computers to reproduce and derive information 
from copyrighted works in ways that, if done by humans, would be infringement.  
After giving an account of the non-expressive use doctrine, this Part describes how 
machine learning technology operates and catalogs the copyright liabilities it 
entails.  Finally, this Part explains why certain applications of machine learning 
challenge the doctrine of non-expressive use by recasting the analysis of the two 
most important factors of fair use:  the purpose of the use, and its effect on the 
market for the works used. 
A. MERE MACHINERY 
When novel technologies emerge, society often doubts their ability to facilitate 
human expression, particularly when those technologies mediate between a human 
subject and the expressive output she creates.20  Copyright jurisprudence, too, tends 
 
 17. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
 18. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 19. Id. at 579. 
 20. For an over two thousand year-old criticism of written language as inferior to memorized 
language, see PLATO, PHAEDRUS (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1999), available at https://perma.cc/TF8J-
FXCY.  See also, Jordan Teicher, When Photography Wasn’t Art, JSTOR DAILY (Feb. 6, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/P3DY-R26C (surveying criticisms of photography); Ira Flatow, Digital Music 
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to look skeptically at machinery inserted into the expressive process.  For example, 
when the Supreme Court first evaluated whether photographs ought to be 
considered copyrightable works of authorship in the 1884 case Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the opinion observed in dicta that the “ordinary 
production of a photograph” may be a process that is “merely mechanical, with no 
place for novelty, invention or originality[.]”21  Only because the plaintiff in the 
case proved the “existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, 
of thought, and conception on the part of the author” of the photograph was the 
Court willing to grant it copyright protection. 22   The Burrow-Giles analysis 
suggests that purely mechanical encodings or transcodings of observed phenomena 
are facts, not authorial expression. 23   More than a century of copyright 
jurisprudence has reinforced this attitude:  to give one example, the most recent 
Supreme Court precedent on originality in copyright, Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., comments that the “mechanical or routine” composition of a work is 
insufficiently original to qualify for protection.24 
In general, reactions to new expressive technologies, in court or in culture at 
large, reveal a belief that machines cannot in themselves impart, apprehend, or 
evince authorial expression.  Machinery must be used by or under the direction of 
an author who has “original intellectual conceptions” if it is to produce 
copyrightable subject matter.25  Of course, as particular technologies are adopted, 
and observers become better attuned to their expressive affordances, this initial 
mistrust tends to lessen.  The copyright statute itself accommodates this pattern by 
defining a copy as a work “fixed by any method now known or later developed” 
and a “device,” “machine,” or “process” as “one now known or later developed.”26  
In other words, while some form of skepticism towards undue mechanical 
intervention in creativity is more or less consistent over a century of technological 
innovation, notions of what exactly constitutes undue intervention vary with 
historical context. 
B. NON-EXPRESSIVE FAIR USE 
Just as copyright treats machines as too dumb to count as authors, it also treats 
machines as too dumb to count as readers.27  If machines cannot create authorial 
expression by themselves, it makes sense to infer that machines cannot engage with 
 
Sampling: Creativity Or Criminality?, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 28, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/WQZ2-B9RZ. 
 21. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).  The writings of early 
photographers and critics show a similar attitude:  an 1865 criticism of photography notes, “[a]ll labor of 
love must have something beyond mere mechanism at the bottom of it.”  Art and Photography, 2 NEW 
PATH 198, 199 (1865). 
 22. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59–60. 
 23. Id. at 59. 
 24. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991); see also 
Bridy, supra note 3, at 6 n.29 (listing copyright decisions that disparage mechanical creation). 
 25. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346–47; Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58. 
 26. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (West 2017). 
 27. Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 658. 
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or appreciate that expression, either.  As computers have become more efficient at 
reproducing, storing, and analyzing vast amounts of copyrighted works, copyright 
law has distinguished this activity from human consumption and excused much of 
it as transformative fair use.  The scholars who have identified this doctrine call it 
“non-expressive” use, and it has evolved considerably over the past quarter-
century.28 
The Ninth Circuit’s Sega v. Accolade decision is one of the earliest judicial 
recognitions of non-expressive fair use. 29   Sega dealt with a dispute between 
defendant Accolade, a company that developed and marketed video games, and 
plaintiff Sega, the developer and marketer of the “Genesis” gaming console.  Part 
of Sega’s business model was to license copyrighted software to independent video 
game developers, who in turn developed and sold video games compatible with the 
Genesis console.  Accolade sought to develop Genesis-compatible games without 
entering into a licensing agreement with Sega.  To do so, Accolade purchased a 
Genesis console and several Sega game cartridges and reverse-engineered them in 
order to copy the functional computer code that allowed game cartridges to operate 
with the console.  Accolade’s reverse-engineering process necessarily generated 
verbatim reproductions of the source code for several Sega games, but only the 
functional code that pertained to the Genesis interface was ultimately included in 
Accolade’s games.30 
The Ninth Circuit held that Accolade’s “intermediate copying” of Sega games 
was fair use, because it was necessary to gain access to the “functional 
requirements for Genesis compatibility”—a functional element of Sega’s games 
ineligible for copyright protection.31  It did not rule on whether or not Accolade’s 
finished games infringed Sega’s copyright, but a claim of infringement could not be 
sustained solely by the inclusion of Sega’s unprotectable functional code in 
Accolade’s games, and the language of the opinion insinuates that the defendants’ 
final games did not infringe.32  This ruling set the precedent that the unauthorized 
reproduction of copyrighted works, if incidental to a non-expressive purpose, was 
non-infringing fair use.33 
The next major development in the doctrine of non-expressive use came with 
two cases evaluating unauthorized use of copyrighted images in search engines, 
Kelly v. Arriba and Perfect10 v. Amazon.34  In both cases, the defendants were tech 
companies that operated image search engines, and the plaintiffs owned copyrights 
to images that had been reproduced in thumbnail form, stored on defendants’ 
 
 28. See Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 661; Matthew Sag, Orphan Works as Grist for the Data 
Mill, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1503, 1503 (2012). 
 29. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Grimmelmann, supra 
note 11, at 661. 
 30. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515. 
 31. Id. at 1518, 1526. 
 32. Id. at 1527–28; Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 667 n.27. 
 33. Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 662. 
 34. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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servers, and displayed to internet users by the defendants’ services.35  And in both 
cases, these activities were found to be transformative fair uses. 
The image search cases added a wrinkle to Sega’s rationale because, unlike 
Accolade, the defendants had duplicated expressive aspects of the plaintiffs’ works 
and presented some of that expression to the public.  In Kelly, the defendant, Arriba 
Soft Corp., operated a search engine that produced thumbnail-sized images in 
response to search queries.  These thumbnails were collected using a “crawler,” an 
automated computer program that traverses the web, visiting and indexing the 
pages it encounters. 36   When it came upon an image, Arriba’s crawler would 
download full-size copies of that image to Arriba’s servers.  Arriba’s software then 
reduced the images to thumbnail size, deleted the full size copies, and featured the 
thumbnails in its search results.37  Google Image Search, the service at issue in 
Perfect 10, created, stored, and displayed thumbnails in more or less the same 
way.38 
To dispense with the argument that Arriba and Google unlawfully coopted 
protected expression, both decisions doubled down on the rhetoric of non-
expressive machinery.  The defendants’ image search engines assembled 
photographs into “tool[s]”—mere machines—not vehicles for conveying 
expression.39  The dispositive element of Kelly’s fair use finding was Arriba’s lack 
of artistic purpose in reproducing Kelly’s images.  While Kelly’s photographs are 
“artistic works intended to inform and to engage the viewer in an aesthetic 
experience[,]” Arriba’s thumbnails are merely instrumental:  they are part of a “tool 
to help index and improve access to images[.]” 40   Arriba’s use is not artistic 
expression, and, the court reasons, the thumbnails’ low resolution makes it unlikely 
that any user would attempt to consume them for aesthetic, rather than referential, 
purposes:  “The thumbnails do not stifle artistic creativity because they are not used 
for illustrative or artistic purposes and therefore do not supplant the need for the 
originals.” 41   This formulation of Arriba’s purpose undergirded the court’s 
conclusion that Arriba’s use was transformative, which in turn allowed Arriba’s 
fair use defense to prevail.42  In Perfect 10, too, Google Image Search repurposes 
 
 35. Both opinions also dealt with the legality of defendants’ display of full-sized copies of 
plaintiffs’ images that were stored on third party servers, through a practice called “inline linking” or 
“hotlinking.”  Kelly initially found such displays to be infringement, then withdrew its opinion for 
procedural reasons and issued an amended opinion that avoided the issue.  Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 
280 F.3d 934, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2002).  The Ninth Circuit’s ultimate resolution of this question in Perfect 
10 analyzed the display right to find that defendants did not in fact display the full-sized images.  
Because this dimension of the litigation does not implicate the fair use doctrine, this Article does not 
discuss it.  Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1154–56; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815. 
 36. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815. 
 37. Id. at 815–16. 
 38. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1155. 
 39. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818. 
 40. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818. 
 41. Id. at 819–20. 
 42. Id. at 819–20. 
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images into “pointer[s] directing a user to a source of information” as part of an 
“electronic reference tool[,]”  rather than aesthetic objects.43 
The capstone of non-expressive use jurisprudence is the Second Circuit’s recent 
decision in Authors Guild v. Google Inc.44  Google Books, the service at issue in 
the case, adapted the doctrine to new subject matter:  literature.  In partnership with 
major libraries, Google scanned over twenty million books, some of which are 
copyright-protected, some of which are in the public domain, and most of which 
are out of print.45  From these scans, Google assembled a corpus of machine-
readable texts that powers its Google Books service.  Google Books is a publicly-
accessible search engine that performs several functions:  first, it enables internet 
users to perform a keyword search on the Google Books corpus, which returns a list 
of all books in the corpus in which the queried terms appear, as well as the terms’ 
frequencies in each book.46  These search results also include general information 
about the books returned by the search query, such as bibliographic information 
and frequent terms contained in the book, as well as links to sites where the book 
can be purchased, if available.47  Second, Google Books sometimes enables users 
to view all or some of a book’s text.  Books that are in the public domain are 
displayed in their entirety, as are books whose publishers have authorized Google 
to reproduce their text in full.48  Other books are displayed in a “limited preview,” 
which displays a limited number of full-text pages, if the owners in those books’ 
copyright have consented to the display.49  A third display option, “Snippet View,” 
shows key words and phrases in a book, as well as “a few snippets—a few 
sentences to display [a] search term in context.”50  Third, Google Books offers an 
interface for researchers to “examine word frequencies, syntactic patterns, and 
thematic markers to consider how literary style has changed over time.”51  This 
information is conveyed chiefly through “n-grams,” phrases of up to five 
consecutive words that are matched with the frequency with which they appear in 
the Google Books corpus.52 
In Authors Guild, Judge Leval of the Second Circuit found Google Books’ 
unauthorized reproductions of copyrighted works a transformative fair use of the 
texts, largely because Google Books provides information “about” books, not the 
books’ expression. 53   Even though “snippet view” shows users the textual 
expression that surrounds a search term, it nevertheless furthers Google’s 
 
 43. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165. 
 44. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 45. Id. at 208. 
 46. Id. at 208–09. 
 47. Id. at 209. 
 48. What you’ll see when you search on Google Books, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://perma.cc/3PJN-
VNRF (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Authors Guild Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp.2d 282, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 52. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2015); Alex Franz & Thorsten 
Brants, All Our N-gram are Belong to You, GOOGLE RESEARCH BLOG (Aug. 3, 2006), 
https://perma.cc/EV9K-PBJU (last visited May 23, 2017). 
 53. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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transformative purpose by contextualizing a term’s usage within a book without 
revealing enough expression to “threaten the author’s copyright interests[.]”54 
Authors Guild is notable because it deploys the logic of non-expressive use to 
circumscribe the “potential market” for a copyrighted work—among the most 
important factors in fair use analysis—in a way that the image search cases do 
not.55  Kelly and Perfect 10 do not spend much time dissecting the types of markets 
that may exist for a work and contemplating which of those markets a copyright 
owner is entitled to control.  Instead, Kelly emphasized the low likelihood of 
meaningful market harms:  if anything, Arriba’s thumbnails would drive users 
towards the plaintiff’s site, rather than detracting from his business.56  Similarly, 
Perfect 10 concluded that the factor favored neither party because evidence of 
market harms remained “hypothetical.”57 
In contrast, Authors Guild explicitly notes that Google Books may well harm 
authors’ markets, but such harms “will generally occur in relation to interests that 
are not protected by the copyright.”58  Authors Guild suggests that, for the purposes 
of fair use’s fourth factor, the relevant potential market only encompasses 
consumers’ interest “in the protected aspect of the author’s work[.]”59  A Google 
Books user interested in a single historical fact may encounter that fact in snippet 
view and, as a consequence, may decide not to procure an authorized copy from a 
bookstore or library.  Google Books therefore might harm an author’s market by 
deterring these purchasers.  Nevertheless, this harm is immaterial to a fair use 
inquiry; Google does not implicate the owner’s entitlements under copyright by 
furnishing a fact that appears amidst expression.60  This reasoning is also used to 
rebut plaintiffs’ claims that Google infringed their exclusive rights to prepare 
derivative works under § 106(2) of the Copyright Act.61  The opinion reiterates that 
plaintiffs’ copyright interest does not extend to the information about their works 
that Google furnishes to the public, and, accordingly, it “does not include an 
exclusive derivative right to supply such information through query of a digitized 
copy.”62 
Authors Guild’s “protected aspect[s]” rationale adapts an approach to the fourth 
fair use factor that Judge Leval himself appears to have pioneered and 
popularized.63  Taken at face value, it is a powerful limitation of the “potential 
 
 54. Id. at 218. 
 55. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2017). 
 56. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 57. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 58. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 224 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 59. Id. at 224. 
 60. Id. at 224. 
 61. Id. at 225. 
 62. Id. at 225. 
 63. Nimmer’s copyright treatise explains, “Only the impact of the use in defendant’s work of 
material that is protected by plaintiff’s copyright need be considered under this factor.  Thus, a court 
need not take into account the adverse impact on the potential market for plaintiff’s work by reason of 
defendant having copied from plaintiff noncopyrightable factual material.”  4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
supra note 55, at § 13.05 (2017).  To support this contention, the treatise cites two cases; the first is the 
Second Circuit’s opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, which discounted the 
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market” factor.  However, the extent of its power is not entirely clear.  If a use does 
not appropriate works’ protectable aspects for human consumption, is this 
dispositive of the fourth factor?  Or does factor four demand a broader inquiry, of 
which the protectable aspects analysis is simply a component?  The opinion 
sometimes appears to limit the fourth factor to substitution of works’ “protected 
aspects;” at other points, it suggests that a fair use inquiry must assess whether the 
use “provides a meaningful substitute for the original,” with no mention of whether 
or not doing so must implicate authors’ protected expression.64 
If a work’s potential market is truly limited to consumers’ interest in its 
expression, then the narrower formulation of the authors’ market would be the 
correct one.  However, in some contexts, Judge Leval seems hesitant to embrace 
this conclusion fully.  For instance, he notes it a virtue of Google Books that it 
“does not provide snippet view for types of books, such as dictionaries and 
cookbooks, for which viewing a small segment is likely to satisfy the searcher’s 
need[,]” thereby avoiding revealing something that “… could usefully serve as a 
competing substitute for the original.”65  If copyright owners’ interests in their 
works extend only to the works’ protected aspects, why is it pertinent that Google 
restricts snippet view for these especially factual categories of works?  The 
“protected aspect[s]” view of the potential market suggests that Google could 
furnish a great many snippets from cookbooks without infringing the authors’ 
copyrights, notwithstanding the impact of that activity on the market for those 
works.  After all, just as some readers purchase biographies to ascertain facts, many 
people surely purchase cookbooks and dictionaries solely to consult the factual 
information they comprise. 
 
relevance of market harms due to the copying of “uncopyrightable information in which Harper & Row 
and Reader’s Digest may not claim ownership” and ultimately found fair use.  Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir.1983), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).  
While Nimmer notes that the decision was “rev’d on other grounds” than its interpretation of factor four, 
it bears noting that the Supreme Court’s reversal in Harper & Row in fact rejected the Second Circuit’s 
analysis of market harms.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 at 567.  The second case Nimmer cites is 
Salinger v. Random House, in which then-District Judge Leval held that an unauthorized biography of 
J.D. Salinger, which quoted from unpublished letters authored by Salinger, did not harm the market for 
those letters “as contemplated by the fair use statute” because “readership may indeed be affected, but 
only by [defendant]’s report of unprotected, historical facts, not by his use of copyright protected 
expression.”  Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev’d, 811 F.2d 
90 (2d Cir. 1987).  On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Leval’s order and rejected his analysis 
that the market for Salinger’s letters would be unimpaired by their use in the biography, citing the new 
guidance it had received from Harper & Row throughout its opinion.  Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 
811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987).  In sum, Judge Leval appears more willing to limit a copyright holder’s 
market entitlements under factor four than other jurists have been when faced with the same or similar 
facts.  The “protected aspect[s]” interpretation of fair use’s fourth factor, while now venerable enough to 
appear in a copyright treatise, owes much of its prominence—and perhaps even its existence—to Judge 
Leval. 
 64. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 220, 225 (2d. Cir. 2015). 
 65. Id. at 222. 
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Computation enables novel forms of value extraction from copyrighted 
materials, and with it, new markets for the information in those works.66  Because 
mechanical analysis of text is presumptively non-expressive, the “protected 
aspect[s]” rationale may dramatically reduce the fraction of the market over which 
copyright grants exclusive rights.  Indeed, inventive entrepreneurs are already 
testing the bounds of rightsholders’ potential markets beyond the circumstances 
Authors Guild evaluated.  While Google forbore from displaying the cookbooks in 
its book corpus, there is clearly immense value in such activity:  Yummly, a startup 
that aggregates the non-protectable elements of online recipes, was valued at one 
hundred million dollars in 2015 and was acquired by Whirlpool in May 2017.67 
C. A TECHNICAL PRIMER ON MACHINE LEARNING 
The doctrine of non-expressive fair use relies on two core premises to excuse 
massive, unauthorized copying undertaken by computers.  The first is that 
machinery cannot, by itself, consume copyrighted expression in an infringing 
manner.  Accordingly, the mechanical ingestion of works is a non-expressive 
purpose, provided it is not to facilitate human engagement with the works’ 
expression.  The second premise is that these uses do not affect works’ potential 
markets in a way that is material to copyright law, because copyright owners’ 
entitlements do not encompass the non-expressive components of their works—the 
very components with which computerized analysis engages, and from which it can 
derive value. 
Emerging applications of machine learning challenge both these premises of 
non-expressive use.  First, machine learning gives computers the ability to derive 
valuable information from the way authors express ideas.  Instead of merely 
deriving facts about a work, they may be able to glean value from a work’s 
expressive aspects; as a result, these uses of machine learning may no longer 
qualify as non-expressive in character.  Second, machine learning technology could 
present a new type of threat to markets for authorial expression:  rather than merely 
supplanting the market for individual works, expressive machine learning could 
also supersede human authors by replacing them with cheaper, more efficient 
automata. 
This sub-Part describes the technology of machine learning to show how it can 
extract value from authorial expression.  The discussion below distinguishes 
machine learning from other forms of AI, which may not pose similar copyright 
liabilities; it also delineates uses of machine learning that likely do qualify as non-
expressive fair use from uses that do not. 
 
 66. For a discussion of some forms of value extraction from machine-readable works, see 
Maurizio Borghi & Stavroula Karapapa, Non-Display Uses of Copyright Works:  Google Books and 
Beyond, 1 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 21, 32–37 (2011) (“Certainly, these new uses generate a 
‘value’ over which many parties have a legitimate claim.  It is not clear on which grounds all the value 
should be appropriated by one party only, namely the ‘user’!”). 
 67. Ingrid Lunden, Whirlpool Acquires Yummly, the Recipe Search Engine Last Valued at 
$100M, TECHCRUNCH (May 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/FBG4-DJR2. 
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AI is a broad and nebulous field that encompasses far more methodologies than 
just machine learning.  From a copyright scholar’s point of view, what makes 
machine learning distinct is that it learns from vast corpora of input data without 
the guidance of human-programmed rules, rather than by applying narrower sets of 
rules and facts that are predetermined by its programmers.  Indeed, well before 
machine learning was as prominent as it is today, computer programs could 
generate content that would resemble—but perhaps not rival—human expression.  
These types of programs tend to rely on rule based representations of the world that 
have been programmed into them by their designers.  A form of AI called an 
“expert system” combines a knowledge base of facts, and rules derived from those 
facts, with an inference engine that reaches conclusions.68   For example, early 
attempts to generate literature using AI often worked by codifying literary 
conventions as abstract “story grammars.”69  These grammars could be deployed in 
tandem with databases of facts about a story—including information about the 
author, the universe in which it takes place, and so on—in order to generate a 
narrative.70  Because this type of AI relies on uncopyrightable facts and procedures, 
it is less likely to entail copyright liabilities, although a copyright may of course 
subsist in the program as a whole.  Furthermore, any copyrightable information that 
ends up incorporated into this AI is likely to be imparted by its developers or their 
collaborators, rather than by nonconsenting third parties. 
Whereas the expert system approach described above starts with a small, high-
quality compilation of human knowledge and builds a system around that 
knowledge, machine learning analyzes troves of data to discern valuable 
information without human intervention. 71   Unlike traditional approaches to 
statistics, some machine learning techniques do not require researchers to make 
assumptions about the distribution of, or relationships within, the data they seek to 
analyze. 72   Thus, rather than analyzing “hard-coded” knowledge baked in by 
human designers, machine learning ascertains patterns from “raw” data.73  These 
methodologies encourage and reward the acquisition of large amounts of data.  
Machine learning is chiefly a predictive technology, and many of its tasks fit 
into two general categories:  classification and regression.  Classification tasks 
associate input data with labels; an example is optical character recognition, a 
process that aims to identify written or printed characters as letters of the 
 
 68. SIMON KENDAL & MALCOLM CREEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING 29-
32 (2007). 
 69. Ira Goldstein & Seymour Papert, Artificial Intelligence, Language, and the Study of 
Knowledge, 1 COGN. SCI. 84–123, 94–96 (1977); see also Lyn Pemberton, A Modular Approach to 
Story Generation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN CHAPTER OF THE 
ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 217 (1989). 
 70. Pemberton, supra note 69, at 218. 
 71. Ali S. Hadi, Expert Systems, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL SCIENCE 
480 (2011); KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE 1–2 (2007). 
 72. MURPHY, supra note 71, at 18–19; Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: 
Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1156–57 (2017). 
 73. IAN GOODFELLOW ET AL., DEEP LEARNING 2–3 (2016), available at https://perma.cc/2SXZ-
ZLVE. 
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alphabet.74  Regression tasks attempt to predict a continuous variable given a set of 
data that may influence that variable. 75   These tasks belong to a category of 
processes called “supervised learning.” 76   Supervised learning requires labeled 
data, that is, data that have been associated with facts about them.77  An example of 
labeled data is a set of photographs of human faces, tagged with the identities of the 
persons pictured.  Machine learning can also be conducted “unsupervised.”  
Unsupervised learning, by contrast, apprehends patterns in data without being 
prompted with a particular kind of label to predict; it just uncovers “interesting 
structure.”78  A solution to a given machine learning task may, at various stages, 
use both supervised and unsupervised learning techniques. 
By uncovering “interesting structure” in data rather than emphasizing features 
that humans have predetermined to be salient, machine learning techniques can 
extract and mimic features that people might find ineffable or difficult to discern, 
but that nevertheless encapsulate some unifying quality of a particular group of 
data.  When trained on samples of an individual’s handwriting or recordings of a 
human voice, for example, machine learning models can mimic scrawls and drawls 
with uncanny accuracy.79  The constellations of features that machine learning can 
appropriate might well be called “personality.”  This capability complicates a 
prevailing assumption in copyright law:  that traces of an author’s “personality” 
uniquely individuate works of authorship, and that those traces ought to be 
copyrightable.80 
The touchstone case on this subject, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 
dealt with the copyrightability of three chromolithographed advertisements for a 
circus.  The Supreme Court, proclaiming that courts should not arbitrate artworks’ 
merit, held that the posters’ lack of artistic pretension did not preclude their 
copyrightability.81  Justice Holmes’s majority opinion reads: 
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature.  Personality always 
contains something unique.  It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a 
 
 74. MURPHY, supra note 71, at 3. 
 75. Id. at 8–9. 
 76. Id. at 1–9. 
 77. Id. at 2. 
 78. MURPHY, supra note 71, at 9; see also Andrew Ng, MachineLearning-Lecture01, 
https://perma.cc/3ZRV-RP5S. 
 79. See Tom S. F. Haines et al., My Text in Your Handwriting, 35 ACM TRANS. GRAPH. 26:1 
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very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.  
That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.82 
Bleistein, a hugely influential judgment, enfeebled copyright’s originality 
requirement. 83   Instead of the proof of “original intellectual conceptions” that 
courts had previously demanded, the Bleistein rationale gives any work wrought by 
a human author a presumed trace of copyrightable personality.84  Subsequent case 
law diminished the standard even further:  in Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine 
Arts, Inc., Judge Frank observed in dicta that “A copyist’s bad eyesight or defective 
musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently 
distinguishable variations.  Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the 
‘author’ may adopt it as his and copyright it.”85 
A personality-centric copyright jurisprudence may never have been 
philosophically coherent or normatively desirable, but it nevertheless holds an 
intuitive appeal.  The factors that individuate humans seem ineffable and 
inimitable, yet are nevertheless unmistakable.  If these qualities are indeed intrinsic, 
affording property rights in them could strengthen autonomy, and if they are indeed 
unique to each person, individuals’ rights would not rival one another.  The 
uniqueness of every human face, for instance, was a premise that Francis Hargrave, 
an eighteenth-century advocate of copyright, used to justify proprietary, personal 
authorship.86 
However, recent advances in machine learning may refute the idea that unique 
personality subsists only in the individual human gesture, or at least undermine it as 
a justification of intellectual property rights.  Machine learning techniques enable 
machines to identify and mimic the features that distinguish sensory data, even 
when those features are not qualities that humans can easily express or represent.87  
Today’s technology can isolate the characteristics that individuate a human face 
and human handwriting, the very attributes that Hargrave and Justice Holmes used 
long ago as metonyms for protectable authorial personality.88 
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D. POTENTIAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENTS IN MACHINE LEARNING 
Training AI on copyrighted works can raise a number of copyright liabilities.  
The clearest potential infringement takes place when training data are reproduced 
in order to be incorporated into a dataset.  Other, more esoteric infringement claims 
may arise when the data are analyzed, or when a trained AI produces output similar 
to the data on which it was trained.  This sub-Part offers a technical description of 
the infringements that machine learning may engender.  Its analysis is diagnostic, 
not prescriptive. 
1. Literal Reproduction in Datasets 
The clearest copyright liability in the machine learning process is assembling 
input datasets, which typically requires making digital copies of the data.  If those 
input data contain copyrighted materials that the engineers are not authorized to 
copy, then reproducing them is a prima facie infringement of § 106(1) of the 
Copyright Act.  If the data are modified in preprocessing, this may give rise to an 
additional claim under § 106(2) for creating derivative works.  In addition to 
copyright interests in the individual works within a dataset, there may be a 
copyright interest in the dataset as a whole.89 
Some input datasets are assembled by digitizing physical media.  Others are 
made by copying and processing born-digital data like ebooks and news 
photographs.90  Many such datasets appear to have been assembled without the 
authorization of the copyright owners whose work they contain.  There are several 
explanations for this practice:  computer engineers may not be informed about or 
concerned with intellectual property law, and therefore may not realize that 
assembling datasets through the mass reproduction of copyrighted materials could 
infringe copyright.  Some may anticipate that fair use will excuse their behavior.  
Others may not believe they have any effective way of licensing the data they use 
and simply hope not to get caught.  However reasonable their justifications, 
researchers who reproduce and/or distribute unauthorized copies of copyrighted 
materials as input data typically depend on the fair use exception to do so. 
Of course, some datasets are compiled through unambiguously legal means.  
Datasets may exclusively comprise public domain works91 or use only copyrighted 
material that has been specifically licensed for data mining and machine learning 
 
 89. See, e.g., Data Sets, COMPUTER VISION RESEARCH LABORATORY, https://perma.cc/6ALB-
YLBL (last visited June 13, 2017) (making available input data for facial recognition algorithms, 
claiming copyright in these datasets and conditioning use on licensing agreements that restrict users’ 
ability to reproduce, modify, distribute, or make commercial uses of the data). 
 90. Yukun Zhu et al., Aligning Books and Movies: Towards Story-like Visual Explanations by 
Watching Movies and Reading Books, ARXIV (June 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/3587-SVVK; Erik 
Learned-Miller et al., Labeled Faces in the Wild: A Survey, in ADVANCES IN FACE DETECTION AND 
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 91. See, e.g., THE NEXT REMBRANDT, https://perma.cc/7A34-8EMT (last visited June 6, 2017). 
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purposes. 92   Moreover, a great deal of copyrighted machine learning data are 
obtained through private contracting.  Large internet platforms’ terms of service 
typically grant the platforms broad licenses to any intellectual property that users 
upload to the sites.  If written well, these licenses almost certainly entitle 
companies to train machine learning algorithms using content uploaded to their 
services by their users.93 
Liability stemming from literal reproduction in datasets may be less likely to 
arise in the future, as technological advances make it possible to conduct more and 
more machine learning without centralized datasets.  In February of 2017, Google 
announced “a completely new, lightweight, machine learning architecture” that 
enables Android wearable devices to generate predictive text using users’ locally 
stored data, without having to copy those data to cloud servers.94  Two months 
later, the company unveiled a technique called “federated learning,” which allows 
for these local models to train and be updated by a shared model stored in the 
cloud.95  In federated learning, all training data are stored on users’ devices, and 
only small updates are transmitted to the cloud.  This, performed across many 
devices, updates a shared model that can in turn be downloaded back onto users’ 
devices.96 
Federated learning obviates the need to construct a centralized database of user 
data for certain applications of machine learning; Google primarily touts this as a 
boon to user privacy and data security.  Just as importantly, this technology and 
others like it may reduce the copyright liabilities associated with machine learning, 
because they can eliminate some of the copying typically required to compile and 
consolidate training data.  However, even learning processes that avoid initial 
reproductions of training data may lead to infringements at later stages, as the 
following sub-Parts explain. 
2. Literal Reproduction as an Intermediate Step 
Once an input dataset has been compiled, it may be copied, emulated, and re-
copied thousands of times during the learning process.97  Some of these copies may 
exist for such transitory durations that they may not meet the statutory definition of 
 
 92. See, e.g., David D. Lewis, Reuters-21578 Text Categorization Test Collection Distribution 
1.0 README File (Sep. 26, 1997), https://perma.cc/V7JJ-CNVW. 
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 94. Sujith Ravi, On-Device Machine Intelligence, GOOGLE RESEARCH BLOG (Feb. 9, 2017), 
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 95. Brendan McMahan & Daniel Ramage, Federated Learning: Collaborative Machine Learning 
without Centralized Training Data, GOOGLE RESEARCH BLOG (Apr. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/XVA2-
J96J.  For a more technical discussion of federated learning, see Brendan McMahan et al., 
Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data, ARXIV (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/P7GX-LXB9. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 71, at 1003–05 (discussing deep auto-encoders, which 
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a “copy.” 98   If, in a literal sense, these steps do create infringing copies or 
derivative works from input data, this intermediate copying is not of great concern.  
For one, the spirit of the copyright statute seems to exempt this type of copying.  
The law is explicit that copies of computer programs created by their owners “as an 
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a 
machine and … used in no other manner” are not infringements.99  This portion of 
the statute does not, of course, excuse intermediate copying in machine learning 
outright:  input data are not always a “computer program,” and engineers training a 
model are often not the “owners” of the input data.  But the reduplication of data 
that takes place during training is much like an “essential-step” replication of 
software in memory, in that it yields ephemeral copies not for further consumption. 
Furthermore, an additional infringement claim during the training stage would 
mean little in practice.  If the initial use of input data is excused by fair use, then 
this intermediate copying will certainly be excused as well; alternatively, if the 
initial use of input data is unfair, the intermediate reproduction of data during 
training would be unlikely to further prejudice the defendant’s case.  Intermediate 
copies are not likely to inflict distinct, calculable harms on a plaintiff, and statutory 
damages are assessed per work infringed, not per instance of infringement.100 
3. Non-Literal Reproduction in Datasets and Models 
Because so much machine learning takes place on unauthorized copies of 
training data, the most pressing concern is infringement at the input stage, as 
described in Part I.D.1.  However, it is possible that infringement could occur even 
when learning is performed using authorized copies of works as training data, 
because machine learning could yield a probabilistic model of the copyrightable 
aspects of a work that falls under the copyright statute’s capacious definition of a 
“copy” or a “derivative work.”101  Take one example:  in 2016, a master’s student 
trained a model to reconstruct the 1982 Ridley Scott film Blade Runner.  This 
model’s training set consisted of every frame of the movie. 102   The model’s 
objective was to learn how to maximize the similarity between frames that it 
generated and frames copied directly from the film.103  After teaching itself to 
 
 98. Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc. held that data stored in a buffer for 1.2 seconds did 
not meet copyright’s fixation requirement, and therefore did not constitute a copy for the purposes of the 
Act.  Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2008).  For 
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1067 (2010); but see MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) 
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from a permanent storage device to a computer’s RAM.”). 
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 103. Id. at 25. 
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recreate Blade Runner, the model outputted a version of the film that resembles a 
rough bootleg.104  The generated version of Blade Runner lacks an audio track and, 
during busy scenes, can have such poor visual fidelity that it appears only to be 
swirling, impressionistic blobs of color.  However, it sometimes contains 
recognizable cinematography, and, most importantly, was derived exclusively by 
copying and recopying Blade Runner, albeit in an innovative way. 
In a situation like this, when all the input data can be assimilated into a single 
“work” for the purposes of copyright law, it seems plausible to deem the model 
derived from these data a derivative work.105  After all, the Blade Runner model is 
purpose-built to create ersatz versions of Blade Runner.  If a trained model always 
ends up replicating its input data, it would be sensible to call the model itself a copy 
or a derivative work—just as a VHS copy of a film always ends up replicating the 
underlying film when inserted into a VCR. 
Even if a model was not intentionally built to mimic a copyrighted work, it 
could still end up doing so to an infringing degree.  Machine learning models 
sometimes reconstruct idiosyncrasies of input data instead of reflecting underlying 
trends about those data.  In the technical parlance, these models are “overfitted;” 
they are undesirable in a predictive context because they capture “noise” rather than 
“signal.” 106   A number of machine learning models analyze sound recordings 
and/or musical compositions in order to learn how to generate music.107  If these 
models had been given a homogeneous enough training set, or if they had been 
overfitted to that training set, they might only be capable of producing output that 
was substantially similar to, or outright duplicative of, their input data. 
Another remote concern is that some machine readable representations of 
copyrighted works, despite comprising metadata rather than full, human readable 
reproductions, could qualify as “copies.” 108   The Million Song Dataset, for 
example, contains factual information about one million songs, as well as 
information about their key, pitch, timbre, tempo, and so on. 109   Google has 
promulgated metadata about the Google Books corpus in the form of n-grams, 
which represent the frequency of words and phrases within the corpus.110  The 
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encodings of works in these datasets are not detailed enough to enable the works to 
be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,” as the Act requires of 
“copies,” but a sufficiently granular representation isn’t difficult to imagine.  
Unless and until machine learning takes place without using unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted works as training data, these more esoteric reproductions will be of 
lesser consequence in practical copyright litigation.  However, the possibility that 
machine learning could produce derivative works suggests that an enterprise would 
still risk liability even if it used authorized copies of copyrighted works as training 
data. 
4. Infringing Output 
Legal concerns may persist after the development of a model.  After all, 
protectable input data are commonly used to train models to generate similar 
output.  If that similarity is “substantial,” then that output may infringe copyright in 
the pre-existing work or works to which it is similar—or, at least, it could be found 
infringing if it were rendered by a human.  While this is an intriguing question, this 
Article’s primary focus is on possible copyright infringement in the inputs to 
artificial intelligence rather than the outputs of artificial intelligence.  This Article 
focuses on inputs rather than outputs for two principal reasons:  first, there has 
already been more legal scholarship about ownership of—or liability for—the 
output of AI.  Second, a practical concern:  while machine learning is developing 
quickly, its outputs have not yet supplanted works of human authorship.  Works 
generated by AI are fascinating and entertaining, but today they remain novelties 
rather than mainstream sources of entertainment or compelling substitutes for 
human expression. 
Nonetheless, the outputs of machine learning models raise several questions that 
are worth cataloging.  How might one assess output for the properties of originality 
and minimal creativity that are required for copyright to subsist? 111   If these 
qualities are present, does there exist a copyright over the output, and in whom 
does it vest?  Most interesting, what would happen if an author alleged that a 
machine learning model’s output infringed her right of reproduction without 
copying her work verbatim?  In conventional copyright litigation, such an 
allegation of non-literal copying requires the plaintiff to demonstrate:  (1) that the 
defendant copied her protected expression; (2) that the allegedly infringing work 
constitutes a “copy”; and (3) that the defendant’s work evinces “substantial 
similarity” to the plaintiff’s.112  Against human defendants, courts can satisfy the 
first requirement with direct evidence of copying, likelihood of access and 
probative similarity between the two works, and “striking similarity” that could 
only have arisen through copying.113  Determining access has, historically, been a 
murky inquiry.  Humans simply do not recall all the cultural products they 
encounter throughout their lives, and they certainly do not store their recollections 
 
 111. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
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in an orderly manner.  The vagaries of the human brain have led to some awkward 
rulings:  George Harrison was found to have “subconsciously” copied a song by the 
Chiffons, and a jury found that the singer Michael Bolton had access to an obscure 
Isley Brothers song because it was played on radio and television in the areas 
where Bolton lived as an adolescent, nearly three decades before he released an 
allegedly infringing song.114 
When a putative infringer is a machine learning model, or the legal persons that 
are its stewards, some aspects of this analysis are simpler.  While it is impossible to 
exhaustively list the copyrighted works that a human being has encountered 
throughout her life, doing so for some machine learning models would simply 
entail examining their training corpora.  If the allegedly copied work is present in 
input data, this would demonstrate access to the plaintiff’s work. 
The situation becomes more complicated, however, when an allegedly copied 
work is absent in input data.  This phenomenon could have several causes:  perhaps 
the model was programmed to find input data by crawling the web on its own, and 
its activities were not logged.  Or, most intriguing, perhaps the model was given a 
known, finite set of input data that excluded the plaintiff’s work, and nevertheless 
created substantially similar output.  This is not as farfetched as it sounds:  consider 
a machine learning model instructed to generate funk music, trained on a corpus of 
all funk recordings except the work of James Brown, the definitive originator of the 
genre.  All funk songs bear a debt to James Brown, so it would not be altogether 
surprising if the funky AI generated output that was substantially similar to his 
work. 
Because creativity is cumulative, rather than ex nihilo, a work can bear the mark 
of works that its author has not encountered firsthand.  This indirect chain of 
influence may be unsurprising to anyone familiar with the creative process, but it is 
not something the judiciary is well equipped to handle.  Precise fact-finding on 
human authorial influence is impossible; to cope with that difficulty, copyright 
doctrine has developed shortcuts that transpose very poorly onto creative situations 
in which direct influence could actually be proven or refuted, like machine 
learning.115  It remains to be seen how the doctrine for non-literal copying would 
address full-scale works of authorship generated by machine learning programs or 
other artificial intelligences. 
These provocations with respect to infringing AI output will remain 
provocations.  Issues of copyright in input data have more practical urgency and, to 
date, have received less academic scrutiny. 
E. MACHINE LEARNING AND FAIR USE 
The previous sub-Part listed the various steps of machine learning that could 
constitute prima facie copyright infringement.  If performed on unauthorized copies 
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of input data, these learning processes must rely on fair use.  Novel applications of 
machine learning push the boundaries of non-expressive use in several ways, and 
may do so significantly enough to alter the fair use calculus.  While the non-
expressive use doctrine readily excuses some applications of machine learning, 
other applications have a much more tenuous fair use defense.  Some cutting-edge 
machine learning changes fair use analysis in two major ways:  first, sophisticated 
machine learning may no longer be “non-expressive,” and therefore may not be 
sufficiently transformative to satisfy fair use’s first factor; second, expressive 
machine learning presents a new threat of market substitution that alters the 
analysis of the fourth fair use factor. 
1. Some Machine Learning is Non-Infringing 
Many forms of machine learning use copyrighted input data for purposes that, 
under current doctrine, appear to constitute fair use.  Facial recognition is a good 
example.  Training a model to identify human faces requires many photographs of 
the individuals one hopes to identify, and these photographs are likely to be 
copyright protected.  Consider, for instance, the Labeled Faces in the Wild 
(“LFW”) dataset, a popular benchmark for measuring the performance of facial 
recognition algorithms.  LFW is a database of 3,233 images of 5,749 people, 
derived from captioned news pictures featured on Yahoo News in 2002 and 
2003.116  Because they correspond to fifteen year old news stories, it is safe to 
assume that most, if not all, of these images were created recently enough that they 
remain copyright protected.117 
Absent some sort of licensing arrangement, anyone who reproduces the LFW 
dataset infringes, prima facie, the reproduction rights of the copyright owners of the 
photographs.  In addition, the academics who promulgate the dataset, and others 
like it, risk liability for distributing the data.  However, several considerations 
strongly suggest this activity is non-infringing.  The first is that the photos in 
“Faces in the Wild” and “Labeled Faces in the Wild” are not complete 
reproductions of their source photographs.  Only the portions of the photographs 
that show the subjects’ faces are reproduced, and they are edited in such a way that 
elides most copyrightable expression in the photographs.  Each is compressed to a 
low resolution and cropped tightly around the subject’s face, seldom including even 
the full head and shoulders.  This processing would eliminate most original 
expression in the photograph, leaving only the physical likeness of the subject.  
Because so little copyrightable content remains in the dataset, a court might well 
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find no “improper appropriation,” and therefore that no § 106(1) violation could 
have occurred. 
Use and distribution of the LFW database may not even require a fair use 
defense, but if they did, the Authors Guild precedent suggests that the defense 
would prevail.  Training facial recognition algorithms on copyrighted photographs 
does not implicate the works’ protectable aspects.  The use analyzes factual 
information—the unique physical features of a subject’s face—in the photographs, 
rather than photographers’ expressive choices.  Moreover, the copied portions of 
the photographs would only receive thin protection, and the amounts taken are 
small.  Finally, the use of these images to perform facial recognition does not 
disturb the market for file photos of notable people to be displayed alongside news 
stories.118 
2. Google’s Natural Language Generation 
While facial recognition may qualify as non-expressive fair use, certain cutting-
edge applications of machine learning may not.  Put simply, they are much more 
expressive than anything courts have evaluated in the past.  In late 2015, Google 
added a feature called “Smart Reply” to its Inbox email service, which is an 
application distinct from but compatible with its Gmail email service.119  Smart 
Reply uses machine learning to automatically generate up to three responses to the 
emails that Inbox users receive, which users can select instead of composing replies 
themselves.120  In its first iteration, the Smart Reply algorithm was trained on a 
corpus of 238 million email messages, presumably sampled from Gmail 
accounts.121  Using a combination of statistical analysis and human review, the 
Smart Reply research team manipulated “the most frequent anonymized sentences” 
in its dataset to train an AI engine that could express the same intention in different 
words, while avoiding redundant suggestions.122 
Unsurprisingly, reading millions of emails may not have taught Smart Reply to 
write sparkling prose.  Google has since sought to improve Smart Reply’s writing 
style by giving the software novels to read.  In a research paper from May 2016, six 
Google employees describe using the BookCorpus dataset, a massive collection of 
ebooks popular in academic research, to train a program to “generate coherent 
novel sentences” that could make Smart Reply more conversational.123  At least 
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some of the novels in BookCorpus were unauthorized copies of copyrighted 
works.124  Their authors were not notified, credited, or compensated for Google’s 
use of their works.125  Many of the books in BookCorpus appear to have been 
copied from the ebook distributor Smashwords.com and contain the platform’s 
standard license, which includes the stipulation, “This ebook is licensed for your 
personal enjoyment only.”126 
Duplicating these novels and using them in machine learning is presumptively 
copyright infringement, but Google is confident that fair use excuses its conduct.  A 
Google spokesman wrote that the use “doesn’t harm the authors and is done for a 
very different purpose from the authors’, so it’s fair use under US law.”127  But 
what exactly is Google’s “very different purpose”?  The same spokesman explained 
that romance novels made good input data because they “frequently repeated the 
same ideas, so the model could learn many ways to say the same thing – the 
language, phrasing and grammar in fiction books tends [sic] to be much more 
varied and rich than in most nonfiction books.”128  In other words, Google sought 
to make use of authors’ varied and rich expression of ideas.  This is the essence of 
copyrightable subject matter.  Google’s use cannot be called non-expressive; no 
longer is the company merely providing facts about books or furnishing a reference 
tool. 
Daniel Schönberger 129  suggests that Google’s BookCorpus research merely 
analyzes “the basic building blocks and patterns of human language,” which are 
“entirely within the public domain.”130  He continues, “the ideas of the authors 
were not in scope of the use and the translation of the model into natural language 
text does not transpose any of the expressive elements in the training material.”131  
This characterization seems at odds with claims in Google’s own research paper 
that the model can “explicitly model holistic properties of sentences such as style, 
topic, and high-level syntactic features[,]”132  features far more expressive than 
mere linguistic building blocks.  Moreover, while it is true that machine learning 
recognizes patterns and is rooted in statistical analysis of data, the fact that 
something is a mechanically recognizable pattern does not necessarily place it in 
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the public domain.  Zechariah Chafee famously opined that copyright protects the 
“pattern” of a work; in the context of plays, this meant “the sequence of events and 
the development of the interplay of the characters[.]”133  Tellingly, another research 
paper in machine learning uses BookCorpus and other data to learn precisely these 
patterns, by training a model to align books’ text with corresponding scenes in film 
adaptations.134  Finally, Schönberger’s claim that the text output of Google’s model 
does not transpose any expressive elements in training data, if true, may not suffice 
to avoid copyright liability.  Reproducing copyrighted books for human 
consumption without authorization is presumptively infringement, irrespective of 
whether those readers go on to write text that resembles the works’ expression.  
Similarly, computerized consumption of authorial expression might also constitute 
infringement if that consumption implicates the expressive value in those works.135 
Google’s use of BookCorpus appropriated authors’ copyrighted expression to a 
greater degree than anything the doctrine of non-expressive use has previously 
justified.  The company’s conduct might fall under fair use, but it is not obvious 
that it would.  This particular research is unlikely to provoke litigation, but in 
principle, it exposes Google to significant damages.  BookCorpus contains 
thousands of copyrighted works, and some of those copyrights were registered 
years before Google published its research.  If Google’s actions were infringing, 
authors with registered copyrights would be able to recoup statutory damages of 
$750 to $150,000 per work infringed.136 
For a company like Google, BookCorpus is a triflingly small dataset.  What 
other data might the company use for similar purposes, and with what 
consequences?  Google has access to a great deal of web content that the company 
may not be explicitly licensed to use.  Consider the email messages that non-Gmail 
users send to Gmail’s more than one billion monthly active users.137  Gmail users 
license their copyrighted email messages to Google as a condition of using the 
service, so Google would be within its rights to conduct expressive machine 
learning using their emails as training data.138  But what about non-Gmail users 
who correspond with Gmail users; can Google extract expressive value from their 
work?  Google’s Terms of Service do treat “send[ing] . . . content to or through our 
services” as a grant of license, but it is not clear that non-Gmail users accept these 
terms simply by sending a message to a Gmail user.139  Indeed, in a 2016 order in 
an ongoing class action wiretapping suit against Google, Judge Koh of the Northern 
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District of California found that non-Gmail users do not consent to Google’s 
scanning of their messages simply by sending emails to Gmail users.140 
Finally, Google has a goldmine of expressive training data unlike any other:  the 
full Google Books database contains twenty-five million machine-readable copies 
of print books. 141   Even before Google Books was found to be fair use, the 
company had been improving its search results and other services by making “non-
display uses” of these books.142  The proposed Google Books settlement would 
have affirmed Google’s right to make non-display uses, which it defined as “uses 
that do not display Expression from Digital Copies of Books or Inserts to the 
public[,]” including “internal research and development using Digital Copies[.]”143  
In 2005, a Google employee told the science historian George Dyson, “We are not 
scanning all those books to be read by people . . . We are scanning them to be read 
by an AI.”144  Authors Guild authorized Google to construct this library for a host 
of non-expressive purposes.  Could Google train expressive, commercial AI on the 
entire Google Books library?  Doing so could train brilliant artificial intelligence, 
but this purpose goes far beyond the uses of the scans that Authors Guild held to be 
fair.  
3. “The Next Rembrandt” 
Expressive machine learning has found purchase in media other than literature, 
too.  In 2014, Microsoft and the bank ING began work on a project entitled “The 
Next Rembrandt.”  A team of engineers collected data about works in Rembrandt 
van Rijn’s oeuvre, from the demography of the subject of the paintings to their 
three-dimensional topography.145  This wealth of data—“150 gigabytes of digitally 
rendered graphics” derived from 346 paintings146—was first used to ascertain that a 
novel Rembrandt painting would likely have been a portrait of a Caucasian male 
with facial hair; age thirty to forty; wearing dark clothing, a collar, and a hat; and 
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facing to the right.  Once this subject was determined, the data were used to train a 
machine learning model that mimicked Rembrandt’s use of geometry, shading, and 
light. 147   This model generated a novel work, which was fixed as a physical 
painting by a 3-D printer using many layers of paint-based ink. 148   A recent 
copyright article somewhat paradoxically describes the output of “The Next 
Rembrandt” as a “new, creative, independent, and original work of art that 
mimicked, but was entirely different from, a genuine Rembrandt.”149  This author 
finds it easier to call the painting a “derivative work,” perhaps even one with the 
same “aesthetic appeal” as one or more of the works it copied for input data.150  Of 
course, Rembrandt has been dead for almost 350 years.151  His paintings are in the 
public domain.  But if this project had been conducted without authorization on the 
oeuvre of a living painter, it is doubtful that the doctrine of non-expressive fair use 
would have excused it. 
4. “Productive” or “Consumptive”? 
The previous sub-Part argued that emerging applications of machine learning 
can no longer be described as non-expressive in character.  This jeopardizes their 
most promising route to a finding of transformative fair use, but it does not, in 
itself, guarantee that the use is unfair.  After all, a great deal of transformative fair 
uses, like parodies, critiques, and collages, are expressive in character.  These uses 
are non-infringing because they are, in Judge Leval’s words, “productive” uses.152  
Rather than being mere consumers or usurpers of others’ expression, the critic, the 
parodist, the collagist are themselves the authors of new expression. 
The dichotomy between productive and consumptive use is a familiar one in 
copyright jurisprudence.  It emerges most clearly in the dialogue between Justice 
Stevens’s majority opinion and Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion in Sony 
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.  In Sony, the Supreme 
Court evaluated whether the use of a videocassette recorder (“VCR") to tape 
copyrighted television broadcasts infringed the copyright holders’ exclusive rights, 
and, in turn, whether electronics manufacturer Sony was secondarily liable for 
infringement facilitated by its VCRs. 153   The Sony majority held that taping 
copyrighted programs for the purpose of “time-shifting”—that is, one-time viewing 
at a later point in time—was a fair use.154  The Court reached this conclusion 
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largely on economic grounds, with little consideration of whether home viewing 
was a productive or transformative activity:  “The statutory language does not 
identify any dichotomy between productive and nonproductive time-shifting, but 
does require consideration of the economic consequences of copying.”155 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent reached an opposite conclusion by distinguishing 
between “productive” uses of copyrighted material and “ordinary,” consumptive 
uses.156  Productive uses “[result] in some added benefit to the public beyond that 
produced by the first author’s work.”157  While productive uses are not always fair 
uses, paradigmatic fair uses, such as those enumerated in section 107’s suggestive 
list, are productive uses. 158   In Justice Blackmun’s assessment, reproducing 
television programs for home viewing was “purely consumptive,” not 
productive.159  Accordingly, it was inappropriate for the Court to excuse it as fair 
use:  “There is no indication that the fair use doctrine has any application for purely 
personal consumption on the scale involved in this case, and the Court’s application 
of it here deprives fair use of the major cohesive force that has guided evolution of 
the doctrine in the past.”160 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent has proven to be at least as influential as Justice 
Stevens’s majority opinion.161  Productivity is a cornerstone of transformativeness, 
today’s most salient criterion.  It so behooves defendants to demonstrate a 
productive rather than a consumptive purpose that “non-expressive use” is 
sometimes referred to as “non-consumptive use.”162  Accordingly, whether a court 
deems expressive machine learning productive or consumptive may determine the 
fate of its fair use defense. 
On one hand, valorizing productivity suggests that Google’s BookCorpus 
research and the “Next Rembrandt” project would be fair use because they 
constitute technological progress.  Making gigabytes upon gigabytes of copies of 
copyrighted art, in order to teach a machine to mimic that art, is indeed a 
remarkable technological achievement.  An artificially intelligent painter or writer 
may yield social benefits and enrich the lives of many beholders and users.  
However, this view of productivity is overbroad.  No human can rebut an 
infringement claim merely by showing that he has learned by consuming the works 
he copied, even if he puts this new knowledge to productive use later on.  Justice 
Stevens’s Sony opinion articulates this problem: 
The distinction between “productive” and “unproductive” uses may be helpful in 
calibrating the balance, but. . . the notion of social “productivity” cannot be a 
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complete answer to this analysis.  A teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is 
clearly productive.  But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his 
personal understanding of his specialty.  Or a legislator who copies for the sake of 
broadening her understanding of what her constituents are watching; or a constituent 
who copies a news program to help make a decision on how to vote.163 
The teacher who copies to broaden his personal understanding is a productive 
consumer, but he nonetheless must pay for the works he consumes.  If the teacher’s 
consumption of copyrighted works inspires him to create new scholarship, so much 
the better, but his subsequent productivity does not entitle him to a refund for the 
works that influenced him.  In much the same way, machine learning makes 
consumptive use of copyrighted materials in order to facilitate future productivity.  
If future productivity is no defense for unauthorized human consumption, it should 
not excuse robotic consumption, either. 
Copyright’s compulsion to differentiate human authorship from mechanical 
outputs obfuscates this simple proposition.  Believing that machines differ 
fundamentally from human authors could imply that expressive machine learning 
always transforms the meaning of the works it appropriates.  In a sense, this is true.  
The “meaning” of a work does depend on its author and its reader.  A word-for-
word duplicate of Don Quijote, written by a nineteenth-century Frenchman, is not 
the same work of literature as Cervantes’s version.164  Text purportedly written by 
software elicits a different reaction than the same text presented as the work of a 
human.165  In theory, copyright acknowledges this proposition:  Judge Learned 
Hand wrote that an independently created version of Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian 
Urn” would be a distinct, protectable work. 166   In practice, however, the law 
disregards the idea, because it threatens to turn the doctrine to unenforceable 
mush.167  Every quotation reshapes meaning,168 but this does not turn every act of 
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copying into transformative fair use; copying undertaken by artificial intelligence 
should be regarded with no less skepticism. 
5. Delineating the “Potential Market” 
The previous sub-Parts have argued that the first fair use factor, “the purpose 
and character of the use,” may weigh against some emerging uses of machine 
learning.  While damaging, this in itself would not vitiate a defense.  Fair use also 
considers the effect a use has on the potential market for the works used.  It is 
difficult to anticipate how courts might assess this factor in the context of 
expressive machine learning.  However, there are two key reasons to think that this 
factor may not point in a defendant’s favor.  The first is that an established market 
for training data already exists.  The second is that expressive machine learning 
presents a novel danger to works’ potential markets by threatening to usurp the 
position of authors themselves, rather than supplanting individual works. 
An instructive precedent is American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., in 
which the Second Circuit held that the photocopying of articles in a scientific 
journal by Texaco’s research scientists, largely to facilitate researchers’ access to 
the articles, was not a fair use.  The facts of this case—the bulk copying of 
copyrighted works by the research arm of a for-profit company—resemble those of 
Google’s BookCorpus research.  The Texaco court did not hold that plaintiffs are 
entitled to compensation whenever their works are used commercially; what is 
relevant is the use’s impact on “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed 
markets.”169  The Second Circuit found that Texaco had adversely impacted such a 
market, noting that the publishers had established a clearance center through which 
interested parties could obtain a license to photocopy articles.170 
Does training data for machine learning constitute a market that is traditional, 
reasonable, or likely to develop?  Surprisingly, it often does.  It is tempting to view 
machine learning as an alchemical process that spins value out of valueless data 
and creates a market where none previously existed.  Considered individually, the 
bits of expression on which a machine learning model is trained are of infinitesimal 
value in comparison to the resulting model.  The expression in a single email 
exchange from the Smart Reply training corpus is, optimistically, of interest only to 
the interlocutors; Smart Reply, on the other hand, could save time and effort for 
hordes of Inbox users.  The idea of a legitimate “market” for emails—at least, for 
emails that would be voluntarily published by their authors—seems preposterous; 
we don’t buy volumes of emails at the bookstore. 171   Even when input data 
comprise conventional “works” like the BookCorpus dataset does, it still seems 
ridiculous to compare those works’ value to that of a machine learning model that 
powers an innovative web service. 
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Appealing as it may seem, the alchemical view of machine learning is a 
misconception.  Computation alone cannot impart value to worthless input:  
“garbage in, garbage out” is a concept that dates back over a century and is a pillar 
of computer science.172  If a machine learning model has value, each training datum 
contributes in some miniscule way to that value.  Of course, a work’s value as input 
data may not have anything to do with the value that copyright allows authors to 
control.  Facebook’s immense collection of images, “tagged” with the identities of 
the people pictured, is valuable largely because it matches one set of facts 
(individuals’ identities) with another set of facts (individuals’ facial geometries).  
These works may contain copyrighted expression, but a facial recognition 
algorithm doesn’t implicate that expression in the least.  Because training a facial 
recognition model does not engage with copyright-protected aspects of training 
images, any market for images qua facial recognition input data is unlikely to be a 
market over which copyright affords rights holders a monopoly.  As Authors Guild 
states, copyright owners’ interests only extend to the “protected aspect” of their 
works. 
However, as the previous sub-Parts explain, some applications of machine 
learning do capitalize on the protectable aspects of input data.  In these cases, 
analysis of market harms must be more nuanced.  Does expressive machine 
learning encroach upon a market in which authors were likely to participate, or 
does it create a new market into which the authors’ legal monopoly should not 
extend?  The appealing answer is that the market created by expressive machine 
learning is a distinct market in which authors are unlikely to participate.  After all, 
wouldn’t these romance novels and emails be practically worthless but for their 
innovative uses in machine learning technology? 
This answer is wrong:  the market for training data has already developed.  A 
paradigmatic business model for technology platforms is to acquire user data in 
exchange for providing gratis services to users.  This user data can then enable a 
firm or its partners to serve users with precisely targeted advertisements, calibrated 
to their particular habits or needs. 173   User data, in aggregate, is immensely 
valuable.174  Of course, some of these data are uncopyrightable:  a user’s browsing 
history, the time she spends on particular pages, or the items she adds to and 
removes from her online shopping cart are all facts.  But some data, like private 
messages, emails, wall posts, and the like, may well be copyrightable, and 
emerging applications of machine learning could implicate the expression the data 
contain. 
Thus, there is already a thriving market for the data that fuel expressive machine 
learning.  When users accept platforms’ terms of use, they take part in a 
transaction.  Oftentimes, that transaction involves an explicit grant of intellectual 
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property rights.  In Facebook’s latest terms of use, one of the first grants the 
document makes is: 
For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos and videos (IP 
content), you specifically give us the following permission, subject to your privacy 
and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, 
royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection 
with Facebook (IP License).175 
Google’s terms grant the company a similar license over user-generated 
content.176  So do Amazon’s.177  It is terms of service like these that authorize 
Google researchers to do things like generating novel piano music using hours of 
piano videos uploaded by YouTube users and distributing the results, with no fair 
use defense necessary. 178   This market for training data is not restricted to 
platforms’ terms of service, either.  Google attempted to license works for “non-
display” purposes in the rejected Google Books settlement agreement.179  Not only 
did the Google Books settlement show Google’s willingness to negotiate non-
display uses in the market, it also offered the plaintiffs a chance to assert that such 
uses presumptively required licensing.180 
The broad IP licenses common to terms of use show a clear market for the 
copyrightable aspects of user-generated content, even if that information on its own 
seems pedestrian and worthless.  There is a great deal of debate about whether this 
market as currently structured is efficient or inefficient, laudable or lamentable, but 
it is certainly a market of some kind. 181   If fair use categorically protected 
companies that sought to conduct expressive machine learning for a commercial 
purpose, it would bypass this market and presumably harm the individuals who 
own the rights to training data.182 
6. A New Threat of Market Substitution 
Expressive machine learning not only jeopardizes the market for the works on 
which it is trained, it also threatens to marginalize authors completely.  Another 
case study elucidates these risks:  Jukedeck is a company that uses artificial 
intelligence, trained via machine learning, to compose and adapt music. 183  
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Jukedeck users can create tracks by selecting from a range of parameters, including 
duration, tempo, mood (“uplifting” or “melancholic”), genre (“piano,” “folk,” 
“rock,” etc.), and instrumentation; once the user sets the parameters, Jukedeck’s AI 
will generate a track that fits the specifications.184  Jukedeck offers three licensing 
options to govern use of the songs its AI generates:  (1) “Individuals, Small 
Businesses or Non-Profits”; (2) “Large Businesses”; and (3) “Buy The 
Copyright.”185  The first two licensing options allow for royalty-free commercial 
and non-commercial uses, but prohibit the user from reselling a track or making it 
available for others to use; the third option is self-explanatory.186  
Jukedeck has not fully disclosed what data it uses to train its AI, although input 
data that Jukedeck has released has been in the public domain.187  It is conceivable 
that the Jukedeck training corpus contains exclusively public domain music. 
However, many of the genres that Jukedeck allows users to select came into 
existence no more than forty or so years ago, such as “Drum ‘N’ Bass” and 
“Synthpop.”188  It is reasonable to assume that the algorithm’s input data contains 
music from these genres.  After all, without such exemplars, it would be difficult 
for Jukedeck’s algorithm to convincingly generate music from those genres.  It is 
therefore probable that at least some of the works in Jukedeck’s training data are 
copyright protected in the United States, since copyright in post-1978 works 
subsists for seventy years past the death of the author.189 
Because Jukedeck’s input data and methods are kept secret, it is unclear whether 
it needs to rely on the fair use defense.  However, imagining how that defense 
would play out elucidates a new complication of the market impact factor.  There is 
no doubt that AI generated, royalty-free sound recordings would jeopardize the 
market for recordings that are composed and performed by humans in a traditional 
fashion.  Jukedeck’s rates are lower than the cost of licensing a conventional sound 
recording.190   Its output is not limited by the constraints human composers or 
recording artists face.  Moreover, the market impact analysis does not merely 
scrutinize the effects of Jukedeck’s use:  rather, it “poses the issue of whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant 
(whether in fact engaged in by the defendant or by others) would result in a 
substantially adverse impact on the potential market for, or value of, the plaintiff’s 
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present work.”191  If use of copyrighted recordings as input data for AI composers 
were unrestricted and widespread, there is no doubt that some section of the market 
for compositions would become completely robotized. 
It should now be clear that some expressive uses of machine learning would, if 
unrestricted, deprive authors of markets they currently exploit.  The affected 
subject matter is by no means limited to sound recordings, either.  Open-source 
software provides a massive training corpus for artificial intelligence,192 which has 
already learned to repair software glitches and even generate novel programs after 
being trained on existing codebases. 193   Writers, too, might find their jobs in 
jeopardy, particularly those in data oriented fields like sports journalism or 
financial reporting.  For instance, Kristian Hammond, a founder of Narrative 
Science, a company whose algorithms generate news articles, estimated that 
“[m]ore than 90 percent” of news journalism will be computer generated by 
2027.194  Expressive machine learning shifts the balance of fair use’s fourth factor 
because it could substitute for the individual works on which it trains and for the 
authors of those works. 
II. AI’S FAIR USE DILEMMA 
Part I discussed the operation of machine learning and listed the potential risks 
of this practice.  It then analyzed the current state of the fair use doctrine as applied 
to computer uses of copyrighted materials and suggested that some expressive 
machine learning cannot rely on present fair use doctrine.  This Part presents 
normative reasons why the fair use doctrine is ill equipped to deal with expressive 
machine learning.  To contextualize artificial intelligence’s fair use dilemma, this 
Part shows how today’s digital economy challenges accepted narratives about the 
nature of digital intellectual property, and, as a consequence, inverts traditional 
paradigms of fair use.  Ensuring that fair use continues to serve the public benefit in 
this new ecosystem will require reassessing the scope and availability of the 
doctrine. 
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A. ONE BAD OUTCOME:  TRAINING AI IS INFRINGEMENT 
The preceding analysis suggests several reasons why current formulations of the 
fair use doctrine may not excuse cutting edge applications of expressive machine 
learning.  If machine learning is indeed not categorically fair use, then an author 
would have a plausible infringement claim against an engineering team for 
reproducing her work in input data without authorization.  While this Article 
criticizes business practices associated with expressive machine learning, it 
recognizes the unique value of the technology.  Make no mistake:  a categorical 
rejection of fair use for expressive machine learning would have disastrous 
ramifications. 
This outcome would be devastating because the remedies that copyright law 
offers are mismatched with the harms an author would suffer from inclusion in 
input data.  If the work in question were registered prior to the infringement, the 
author could claim statutory damages of at least $750 per infringed work, and up to 
$150,000 per work if the infringement were deemed willful.195  Because machine 
learning datasets can contain hundreds of thousands or millions of works, an award 
of statutory damages could cripple even a powerful company.  Conceivably, a 
plaintiff could enjoin a defendant from proceeding with a machine learning 
operation, though it is unlikely that a court would offer such a drastic equitable 
remedy in a case involving input data. 
Most worrisome, however, is the chilling effect that a single adverse ruling 
could have on the development of machine learning.  Machine learning promises to 
streamline legal drudgery and bring a form of advocacy to parties who otherwise 
would not be able to access it.196  Writers who were employed to perform formulaic 
composition might be able to devote their energies to more creative forms of self-
expression once machines supplant them.  Professors might find more time to do 
research if an artificial intelligence engine automatically emailed with students for 
them.  Copyright law can make or break emerging technologies, and it would be a 
shame if machine learning’s immense potential benefits foundered on copyright 
concerns. 
Limits on machine learning could also impoverish research efforts.  For 
example, in the European Union, member states typically rely on enumerated 
exceptions to copyright law, rather than the more protean, and potentially more 
capacious, fair use doctrine.  The United Kingdom’s copyright statute contains an 
exception for “text and data analysis for non-commercial research,” but in general, 
legal hurdles to computational analyses of copyrighted works remain higher in 
Europe than in the United States.197  Some empirical analysis suggests that these 
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restrictions have hampered relevant academic research, in comparison to countries 
with broader exceptions to copyright protection.198  What’s more, restrictions on 
unauthorized uses of copyrighted input data might afford powerful or deep-
pocketed incumbents singular access to high-quality data and thereby entrench 
them as the only innovators in the field.  Still more worrisome, machine learning 
models trained only on readily available or freely licensed data might codify 
pernicious biases present in those data.199 
Kneecapping cutting edge machine learning with an adverse fair use judgment 
could jeopardize the technology’s social value, or drive innovation to a foreign 
jurisdiction with relaxed copyright constraints.  That said, a finding of fair use for 
expressive machine learning is hardly an appealing alternative. 
B. ANOTHER BAD OUTCOME:  TRAINING AI IS FAIR USE 
Imagine that an influential precedent, handed down in early 2018, resolves the 
doctrinal ambiguities discussed in this Article, declares broadly that expressive 
machine learning is fair use, and is understood by engineers and general counsels 
as giving carte blanche to unauthorized uses of copyrighted input data in AI 
development.  Call it an Authors Guild for expressive uses of copyrighted material.  
This world, in all likelihood, would not be all that different from the world we 
currently inhabit.  After a few years of unrestricted expressive machine learning, 
however, it could be drastically worse. 
It is well known that, unless counterbalanced by major policy changes, advances 
in artificial intelligence threaten to exacerbate inequality.  The Obama White 
House’s recent report on “Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy” 
forecasts a shift in income from labor to capital as automata begin to supplant 
human laborers. 200   In response, among other things, the report recommends 
bolstering the social safety net to support the millions of people whose livelihoods 
will be disrupted or eliminated by artificial intelligence. 201   These and other 
attempts to equalize the distribution of wealth could be funded in part by a 
modernized tax regime, the report suggests.202  Elon Musk advocates a universal 
basic income that could leave individuals free to pursue meaningful work while 
robots take over the drudgery, while Bill Gates recommends a redistributive tax on 
“the robot that takes your job.”203 
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It would indeed be wonderful if advances in AI and progressive policy changes 
provided ordinary humans with greater economic stability and more leisure time to 
devote to meaningful work.  However, there is little to guarantee that such a safety 
net will ever be in place for the individuals displaced by AI, let alone in the near 
future.  This political reality makes it difficult to countenance a fair use paradigm 
that allows sophisticated actors to extract expressive value from copyrighted works, 
without compensation to authors, in the service of technology that may well 
deprive those authors of a livelihood.  Furthermore, encouraging robotic forms of 
reading may impoverish the human expressive faculties we presumably cherish—
and place perverse restrictions on the kinds of expressive activities humans may 
use their newfound leisure time to explore.  Why should a digital humanities 
scholar devour millions of texts without compensating their authors, while a more 
conventional literary hermeneut—or an ordinary reader—must pay for the 
copyrighted works she interprets?204 
Of course, no copyright policy could fully address the concerns that the Obama 
administration or Elon Musk or Bill Gates have articulated.  Copyright will not 
restore to truck drivers the livelihoods that many of them will soon lose to 
automation.205  Nor will copyright law secure workers whose every move in the 
workplace is recorded and used to train their robotic replacements.206  But the need 
for broader social reforms should not lead us to overlook existing doctrine that 
could be used to promote greater distributive justice. 
In addition to its potential to worsen economic inequality, a final, extreme 
concern is that a permissive fair use doctrine for expressive machine learning could 
precipitate an existential risk to humanity.  As Grimmelmann has suggested, 
progress in AI, enabled by broad fair use exceptions, may not correspond to 
progress for the human species.  Unchecked robotic reading could hasten the rise of 
superintelligent machines, technology that could easily outsmart and outgun its 
human handlers.  Unless programmed to adhere to some human view of the good—
on which, of course, consensus would be elusive—a superintelligent computer 
could wipe out humanity if doing so were instrumentally useful to it.207   
C. FAIR USE:  OLD AND NEW NARRATIVES 
Taken together, the preceding two sub-Parts contend that the fair use doctrine, as 
currently construed, cannot equitably resolve some cases involving expressive 
machine learning.  This is because each outcome appears to contradict at least one 
of the underlying objectives of the fair use doctrine, and of copyright law more 
generally.208  An expansive fair use defense for machine learning would promote 
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technological progress, but it would deprive “contributors to the store of 
knowledge” of “a fair return for their labors.”209  In turn, a finding of infringement 
would justly affirm authors’ exclusive rights to exploit their protected expression, 
but it could hamstring a new, promising technology.  
Expressive machine learning presents an especially difficult dilemma because it 
undermines accepted narratives about fair use in the digital economy.  In the late 
twentieth century, the proliferation of media technology pitted incumbent rights 
holders against individual end users.  New technologies simultaneously facilitated 
widespread copying of copyrighted works and afforded rights holders more 
granular control over how their works could be consumed.  Unauthorized 
consumption by individual users became a threat to rights holders’ bottom lines, 
and in response, copyright owners sought and secured greater powers to control 
uses of their works.210  In turn, scholars and activists worried that rights holders’ 
greater control over works would chill expression and turn every act of 
consumption into an opportunity for rent seeking.211 
The theoretical backdrop to this debate is the market failure theory of fair use, 
which Wendy Gordon articulates in a seminal article from 1983.  Gordon, 
criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s judgment against Sony in Universal City Studios, Inc. 
v. Sony Corp. of America—which would be reversed by the Supreme Court the 
following year212—contends that uses should be considered fair if they:  (1) occur 
under conditions of market failure; (2) serve the public interest; and (3) do not 
present such a substantial injury to a plaintiff that incentives would be impaired.213  
Gordon uses “market failure” to refer to scenarios in which a socially desirable use 
of intellectual property cannot be effectuated by market forces.214  As examples of 
possible failed markets, Gordon cites uses of copyrighted materials that are 
rendered inefficient by high transaction costs; uses that engender nonmonetizable 
positive externalities, like scholarship; and uses that implicate difficult-to-price 
values such as wellbeing and free expression.215  Market failure, Gordon writes, is a 
precondition for an economically justified finding of fair use.216 
As digital technologies reduced the costs of licensing transactions, some 
scholars adapted market failure theory to justify extensive “fared use” regimes in 
which essentially all uses of copyrighted materials—perhaps even parody—would 
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be paid for, rather than excused by fair use. 217   In response, other scholars 
developed distributive and normative critiques of this expansion of market failure 
theory.218  These writers’ concern was that a “fared use” model would advance the 
interests of established rights holders while inhibiting participatory semiosis and 
downstream uses of copyrighted works. 219   Matthew Africa notes that market 
failure analysis encourages licensing creep, whereby “borderline uses”—uses that 
may well be noninfringing fair uses—are licensed by risk averse parties with the 
means to do so.220  This threatens less powerful creators, who cannot afford to pay 
customary licensing fees for the building blocks of their expression, even though 
that expression may in fact be non-infringing. 
As an alternative to ubiquitous licensing, Robert Merges proposes 
reemphasizing the redistributive aspects of copyright law.221  By recognizing that 
copyright is itself a subsidy to creators, fair use can in turn be understood as a tax 
on rights holders that facilitates certain categories of users, like critics, parodists, 
and educators.222  Fair use should not subsist only in areas where the market fails; 
rather, Merges advocates focusing on the categories of uses that should be 
effectively subsidized with permission to circumvent the market through fair use.223 
The contemporary perception of fair use emerged from this factual and 
theoretical context.  On one side, commentators projected that fair use would 
obsolesce as technological advances facilitated ever more granular licensing 
arrangements that allowed individual users to pay for the works they consumed.224  
On the other side, commentators characterized fair use as a public entitlement and a 
safety valve for expressive freedom, and suggested that the stringent controls 
afforded to rights holders in the 1990’s often amounted to anti-competitive 
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corporate overreach.225  The vision of fair use that this discourse produced was, 
depending on one’s perspective, either a tax on rights holders or a bulwark against 
monopolistic enclosure of intellectual property.  Whether one agreed or disagreed 
with how it operated, fair use was characterized as a redistributive mechanism that 
subsidized public pursuits at major content owners’ expense. 
Today’s digital economy upends this narrative.  Today’s ordinary end users are 
not passive consumers of others’ intellectual property.  Rather, they create troves of 
text, images, video, and other data that they license to large companies in exchange 
for gratis services.  Powerful technology companies are now users of copyrighted 
material, and the companies’ end users are the rights holders.  This pivot in market 
dynamics should prompt a corresponding shift in attitudes towards fair use.  The 
doctrine no longer redistributes wealth from incumbents to the public; it shifts 
wealth in the other direction, from the public to powerful companies. 
1. The Familiar Narrative:  Big Content, Little Users  
Copyright rhetoric in the digital age tends to reflect two worries, both due to 
digital media’s unprecedented enabling of the duplication, recombination, and 
exchange of information.226  The first worry—palpable in the debate over the Sony 
VCR in the 1980’s227 to peer-to-peer file sharing in the early 2000’s228  to the 
present-day paradigm of unauthorized copies on file locker or streaming sites229—
was that unauthorized personal consumption by individual users would kill rights 
holders by a thousand cuts.  Individual users’ ability to harm copyright owners 
through personal use is, in Niva Elkin-Koren’s words, a “fundamental feature of 
cyberspace.”230  The more straightforward and more pervasive copying became, the 
more that unauthorized personal uses threatened familiar business models. 
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As this narrative of individual users threatening copyright owners developed, a 
reciprocal narrative emerged:  that overzealous copyright enforcement by rights 
holders would chill individual users’ self-expression.  In addition to facilitating 
unauthorized private copying, networking technologies gave rights holders new 
tools to monitor and regulate uses of their works and create licensing markets 
where none previously existed.  Incumbents successfully lobbied to strengthen their 
copyrights in at least two ways. 231   First, rights holders gained statutory 
entitlements through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which permitted them 
to curtail the scope of fair use through technological self-help strategies. 232  
Second, rights holders extended the duration of copyright protections, which 
chiefly benefited the companies and heirs who retained the rights to a small 
percentage of lucrative works.233  As corporations clamored for longer and stricter 
enforcement of copyright, scholars worried that a pivot to stringently regulating 
individual uses of copyrighted works would hinder individual freedom to 
participate in culture, to learn, and to exchange information. 234   Accordingly, 
scholars like Merges emphasized fair use’s redistributive origins and advocated 
viewing the doctrine as an express subsidy for certain privileged activities.235 
Though they may be opposing narratives, the two strains of copyright rhetoric in 
the digital age share two general themes:  (1) that widespread infringement 
threatens established, incumbent businesses; and (2) that aggressive copyright 
enforcement by these incumbents could jeopardize the expressive freedoms of 
entities with less economic or legal power.236  Together, they form a discourse in 
which Little Users infringe the economic rights of Big Content and Big Content 
tramples the expression of Little Users. 
2. The Familiar Narrative Inverted 
Undergirding the familiar narrative of digital copyright is the gospel (or dogma) 
that digital media fosters participatory culture.  Networking, more than earlier 
technologies, enables ordinary individuals with minimal equipment to create, 
 
 231. If it is tendentious to characterize the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) as the consequences of corporate lobbying, that tendentiousness 
is widely shared.  In his official opposition to the CTEA, Senator Hank Brown wrote, “This bill reduces 
competition and primarily rewards those who lobby Congress rather than those who create.”  S. REP. 
NO. 104-315, at 36. 
 232. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (West 2008) (prohibiting the circumvention of “a technological measure 
that effectively controls access to a work” protected by the Copyright Act). 
 233. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 234. Elkin-Koren, supra note 230, at 288–89. 
 235. Merges, supra note 218, at 134–35. 
 236. Of course, threats to established business models don’t just harm kingpins.  Content industry 
rhetoric rightly emphasizes the diversity of the artists and businesspeople it sustains.  In Senate 
testimony, the musician Lars Ulrich described the recorded music business as “an industry with many 
jobs, a few glamorous ones like ours, and lots more covering all levels of the pay scale and providing 
wages which support families and contribute to our economy.”  See Music on the Internet:  Is There an 
Upside to Downloading? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement 
of Lars Ulrich, Member and Co-Founder, Metallica Musical Group). 
SOBEL, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE’S FAIR USE CRISIS, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 45 (2017) 
2017] ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE’S FAIR USE CRISIS 87 
exchange, and recombine media.  Culture’s “recipients,” once networked, become 
“participants.”237  Sometimes, more participation is deleterious:  individuals who 
might have passively watched broadcast television can now actively share 
infringing copies of copyrighted media and threaten creators in the process.  Other 
times, that participation is salutary:  the internet enables innovations from the 
backwater to reach the mainstream, and, better yet, to commingle with other memes 
into something entirely new. 238   In the headiest days of early user generated 
content, Time commemorated “You”—every reader who held that issue of the 
magazine and saw his or her reflection in its mirrored cover, a synecdoche for the 
millions of bloggers, video uploaders, and social networkers that the World Wide 
Web empowered—as its 2006 person of the year.239 
The Internet’s affordances for fixing and disseminating expression turned 
ordinary end users into “authors” in the legal sense.  Of course, this is not to say 
that people expressed themselves more in the digital age than in any other, or that 
they did so more creatively or originally.  Their expression simply became easier to 
fix “in a tangible medium” and share with large numbers of people.240   User 
generated content, unless it improperly appropriates some other expression, is user 
owned content.  Media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter do not own 
the copyrights to much of the content they furnish to users; rather, the platforms are 
licensees of content owned and uploaded by their users.  This business model—a 
few Big Users monetizing lots and lots of Little Content—upends the premises of 
1990’s copyright rhetoric. 
The metamorphosis of users into authors appears to have democratized semiotic 
power, for better and for worse.241   In all likelihood, it has also enlarged and 
diversified the group of people that owns the rights to popular media.  But these 
changes do not appear to have triggered a commensurate disaggregation of 
economic power.  As Internet users took advantage of networking technology to 
create, share, and consume expression, companies emerged to monetize these 
expressive acts.  Today, it is a handful of monolithic corporations that facilitate the 
web’s participatory meaning making. 
Ultimately, user generated data are what drive artificial intelligence.  Cutting 
edge AI needs large amounts of high quality data to perform well; companies with 
the best and broadest access will be able to harvest the best data.  For example, 
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Google’s online translation service may behave as if it were pure machinery, but it 
in fact comprises thousands of insights gleaned from real human translators whose 
work appears online, or who furnish improved translations while using the service.  
Jaron Lanier writes: 
A giant act of statistics is made practically free because of Moore’s Law, but at core 
the act of translation is based on the real work of people.  Alas, the human translators 
are anonymous and off the books.  The act of cloud-based translation shrinks the 
economy by pretending the translators who provided the examples don’t exist.  With 
each so-called automatic translation, the humans who were the sources of the data are 
inched away from the world of compensation and employment.242 
Because better data breed better services, scholars have observed that 
technology platforms can follow a “winner-take-all” economic distribution. 243  The 
more user data a company can collect, the more it can improve data driven services 
like machine learning.  These improved offerings will attract more users, and thus 
more data.  This positive feedback loop enables so-called “super-platforms” to 
consolidate market power.244 
In today’s platform economy, value emerges not from the ownership of 
intellectual property rights in data, but from the ability to make licensed use of 
large amounts of data.  Big Users are hegemonic, not Big Content.  This reshuffling 
of owners and users demands a corresponding readjustment in intuitions about fair 
use. 
Fair use limits rights holders’ economic entitlements to subsidize certain classes 
of users.245  This subsidy is often justified by the particular “public benefit” that 
these uses provide.246  A fair user is motivated by a “humanitarian impulse” beyond 
personal profit. 247   The uses that the copyright statute enumerates as 
paradigmatically fair—“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, … 
scholarship, or research”—are characterized by a dedication to a purpose distinct 
from profit.248  They are, in Justice Blackmun’s words, “activities the primary 
benefit of which accrues to others”, and they stand in implicit contrast to purely 
commercial uses.249 
Moreover, fair use is characterized as a safety valve to prevent the powerful 
from smothering the expressive rights of the less powerful.  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly described fair use as one of the “speech-protective purposes and 
safeguards” built into the law to offset rights holders’ monopolies.250  Fair use 
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redistributes economic and expressive power.  It curtails an otherwise outsized 
legal and economic entitlement so that “the public” can undertake certain socially 
beneficial activities.  If the doctrine develops to give carte blanche to expressive 
machine learning, it will redistribute in the opposite direction:  it will serve the 
economic interests of incumbent firms at the expense of disempowered rights 
holders. 
Commercial machine learning, trained on expressive media, promises 
tremendous social value.  But it is not the sort of value that fair use exists to foster.  
Unlike the benefits realized by, say, scholarship, the value of advanced machine 
learning services is internalized by the large firms that furnish those services.  The 
companies with the best machine learning technology can use this to consolidate 
their market power, which in turn gives these firms the best access to user data that 
will further improve their machine learning technology. 
The historical narrative of copyright and technology is one of powerful rights 
holders and marginal users.  Today’s tech business turns this structure on its head.  
Accordingly, scholars and jurists ought to recalibrate their intuitions about what 
fair use is and does.  A progressive interpretation of copyright does not, in this 
circumstance, entail a broad construction of fair use.  Indeed, upholding copyright’s 
redistributive roots may require a return to the market based reasoning that, at the 
time, seemed to move against redistribution. 
D. WHAT KIND OF PROGRESS? 
The Constitutional mandate of copyright law is “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts[.]”251  Expressive AI’s fair use dilemma puts technological 
development at odds with certain forms of human authorship.  Which kind of 
progress should the law privilege?  Permissive fair use for machine learning would 
undeniably foster progress in the scientific field of artificial intelligence.  It might 
also foster a certain kind of artistic progress.  Unencumbered by copyright, AI 
could learn from all the greatest books, movies, and music.  Perhaps this erudite AI 
would become so adept at making art as to supersede human creativity.  The public, 
enamored of masterful robot art, might come to view human art as a primitive 
novelty, like paintings done by elephants.  Human creators, in turn, might not 
derive any incentives from copyright law if robotic rivals undercut their earning 
potential.  If robotic creators gave the public access to more, and better, works of 
art than any human artistic establishment could deliver—and, in so doing, 
marginalized the human artistic establishment—would that be the progress 
copyright law exists to promote? 
Some formulations of copyright’s purpose suggest that this is the progress the 
law prizes.  Courts often describe copyright as an incentive system, designed with 
the ultimate goal of facilitating the creation of works for public consumption.252  If 
the goal is to ensure a supply of works for the public, it may not matter whether 
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those works were created by humans or robots.  If literate AI can furnish works the 
public wants to consume at a lower price point than human competitors, is this not 
the precise societal benefit that copyright exists to foster? 
Maybe, maybe not.  There is reason to think that copyright’s progress mandates 
something more than the accrual of works.  Barton Beebe distinguishes between 
“accumulationist” accounts of progress and a “pragmatist aesthetics” of progress.  
Beebe’s aesthetic progress “focuses not on the stockpiling over time of fixed, 
archivable works but rather on the quality of ephemeral aesthetic experience in the 
present. . . . [P]ragmatist aesthetics measures aesthetic progress (or regress) largely 
by the extent of popular, democratic participation in aesthetic practice.”253  In other 
words, the existence or the consumption of many cultural products may not suffice 
as progress; progress also entails meaningful participation in the creation of those 
cultural products.  The progress of science is not, in Jessica Litman’s words, “a 
giant warehouse filled with works of authorship.” 254   The value in human 
authorship flourishes still further when it is consumed, appreciated, and 
transformed by other humans.  This cycle of creation and engagement is what the 
law clumsily tries to protect and propagate.  Indeed, copyright places special value 
on human creativity and human reading; it “protects humans writing for 
humans.”255  Therefore, doctrine that diminishes humans’ capacities to create and 
engage with expression should be viewed warily.  Fair use may be moving in this 
direction:  Grimmelmann cautions that regulation of human readers and leniency 
towards robotic readers “discourages the personal engagement with a work that 
[copyright law] claims to value.  Copyright’s expressive message here—robots 
good, humans bad—is the exact opposite of the one it means to convey.”256  If 
human authorship and human readership are indeed as special as copyright law 
suggests they are, it would be perverse for the law to marginalize human authors 
and readers in favor of erudite, eloquent machines.  For this reason, a fair use 
regime that privileges the progress of robotic authors over incentivizing human 
authors warrants caution. 
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
If given the opportunity to rebuild copyright from the ground up, a sensible 
person motivated by the public interest would probably not reconstruct it exactly as 
it exists today.  But the current chimerical doctrine offers an extraordinary 
opportunity:  a faithful interpretation of the doctrine suggests that progressive 
intervention is warranted.  Parts I and II of this Article argued, respectively, that it 
is neither doctrinally correct nor normatively desirable for fair use to privilege 
unauthorized, expressive uses of copyrighted works in commercial machine 
learning.  This Part contemplates several ways out of artificial intelligence’s fair 
use dilemma.  The purpose of this Part is not to identify a single panacea for AI’s 
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fair use crisis, let alone for the larger societal issues that AI raises.  Rather, it is to 
demonstrate that there is no inevitable course the doctrine must take, and that some 
potential outcomes are more desirable than others. 
A. LEVIES 
Past technologies have presented copyright dilemmas not unlike the one 
described in Part II.  On at least one occasion, Congress was willing to enact levies 
to address the problem.  In the late 1980’s, the advent of digital audio tape (DAT) 
technology allowed consumers to create “perfect” copies of recorded audio.  The 
United States music recording industry, worried that widespread adoption of DAT 
technology would endanger their business model, threatened to sue the 
manufacturers and distributors of DAT technology. 257   To mediate, Congress 
passed the Audio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”).  The AHRA addressed 
copyright owners’ concerns by attaching levies to the distribution of “any digital 
audio recording device or digital audio recording medium,” which were allocated to 
two funds defined in the statute:  the Sound Recordings Fund and the Musical 
Works Fund. 258   Interested parties were further subdivided by the statute and 
disbursed royalties.259   In return, the Act shielded hardware manufacturers and 
distributors from liability by prohibiting infringement actions related to the 
distribution or noncommercial use of digital audio recording devices or media.260 
The AHRA was no panacea.261  In particular, the Act’s narrow definitions of 
digital audio and media meant it applied only to outmoded technologies.262  In the 
leading AHRA case, Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond 
Multimedia Systems, a recording industry association sued the manufacturers of an 
MP3 player for noncompliance with the AHRA.  The defendants maintained their 
device was not a “digital audio recording device” for the purposes of the Act, an 
argument that the district court concluded “would effectively eviscerate the 
AHRA.”263  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found for the defendants as a matter of 
first impression, concluding that “the Act seems to have been expressly designed to 
create this loophole.”264 
As ineffectual as it was, the AHRA might illuminate a solution the machine 
learning dilemma.  The AHRA addressed a juridical logjam not unlike the problem 
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of expressive machine learning.  As is the case with machine learning, pre-AHRA 
copyright law could either have buried a new technology by finding DAT 
distributors secondarily liable for infringement, or undermined rights holders’ 
economic interests by allowing the technology to proliferate without restriction.  
Congress addressed the legal uncertainty with a compromise that enabled DAT 
technology to enter the market and provided some compensation for the music 
industry’s foregone revenue. 
Of course, home audio taping is not machine learning.  The AHRA regulated 
technologies that might be used to make unauthorized copies of works.  In machine 
learning, the clearest copyright infringements happen before, or during, a model’s 
public deployment.265  Machine learning corpora comprise far more works by far 
more individuals, and the individual harms it causes are far smaller.  The number 
and variety of the works implicated in expressive machine learning could make for 
an accounting regime even more convoluted than that of the AHRA. 
Still, this approach—levying one’s way out of a doctrinal and economic 
dilemma—could bear fruit, and the AHRA shows that the United States legislature 
was willing to support something like it the past.  It also resembles the more 
general solutions that are already being proposed to allay AI-related fears.  In a 
draft report to the European Parliament’s Commission on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics, rapporteur Mady Delvaux highlighted “the possible need to introduce 
corporate reporting requirements on the extent and proportion of the contribution of 
robotics and AI to the economic results of a company for the purpose of taxation 
and social security contributions[.]” 266   The Obama White House report on 
“Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy” notes that “[a]dvanced AI 
systems could reinforce trends of national income shifting from labor to capital . . . 
[and] significantly exacerbate the rise in income inequality seen over the past few 
decades, absent an appropriate policy response[,]”  such as a progressive taxation 
regime with higher taxes on capital.267 
Moreover, while comprehensive tax reform might seem redistributionist and 
unpalatable to a large segment of the United States, AI’s fair use dilemma gives 
progressive policymakers greater leverage.  Because an honest interpretation of fair 
use threatens the future of expressive AI, levies on machine learning could be seen 
as a bargain rather than a taking.  In exchange for a levy or taxation regime, the 
legislature could prohibit infringement actions related to machine learning and 
thereby secure the future of the technology. 
Calculating the appropriate levy, and prescribing its disbursement, is a more 
ambitious task than this Article can fulfill.  But potential models already exist.  One 
would be to establish AHRA-style funds for authors of training data and outline 
royalty rates by statute; in the AHRA’s case, royalties were set at a percentage of 
the transfer price bounded by statutory maxima and minima that could be revised 
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by Copyright Royalty Judges.268  A similar example is the rejected Google Books 
Settlement, which proposed a Book Rights Registry to collect proceeds of Google 
Books sales and distribute them to appropriate rights holders.269  Alternatively, 
because individual uses are difficult to value and to track, machine learning levies 
could bypass the accounting stage entirely.  They might be remitted to appropriate 
artistic charities, as was prescribed for unclaimed funds in the Google Books 
settlement.270  They might reinforce a general safety net for all citizens.  Or they 
might be put towards government programs specifically designed to support 
individuals who seek to make a living from creative, intellectual work. 
B. DOCTRINAL INNOVATIONS 
AI’s fair use crisis is a result of a doctrinal logjam, so doctrine will be unlikely 
to solve it.  Nonetheless, judges could take some imaginative actions to enforce 
compromise.  One way to do so would be taking one of Lanier’s admonishments to 
heart:  “Big data has to be understood as repackaging of human labor.  It’s not 
stand-alone automation, it’s human-driven automation[.]”271  As a practical matter, 
the progress of science does not appear ex nihilo; even the most original authors are 
influenced by others’ works.  This influence is devilishly hard to quantify, but the 
law has tried to do so in the past by apportioning works’ proceeds to rights holders 
with competing interests, proportional to their contributions to a work. 272  
Theoretically, the judiciary could offer plaintiffs compensation on a case by case 
basis without affording them the power to destroy expressive machine learning.  In 
general, copyright is structured to avoid overlapping entitlements.273  However, a 
judge could find a machine learning model to be a derivative work based on its 
training data, and use this finding to mandate apportionment of profits. 
C. MOONSHOTS 
The levy system described above is a modest compromise—a step, not a leap, in 
the right direction, and perhaps a foot in the door to justify broader reform.  It will 
not, by itself, ensure distributive equity or shepherd the middle class through the AI 
age.  Far bolder proposals exist.  Some are technological:  the abortive Project 
Xanadu has sought for decades to supplant the internet’s HyperText Markup 
Language (“HTML”) standard with a system of two way linking that affords 
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content owners greater control over the use of their works.274  At the very bottom of 
its bare bones homepage, Project Xanadu offers the gnomic disclaimer, 
“DIFFERENT COPYRIGHT SYSTEM REQUIRED.  Our matching copyright 
system for indirect content:  the transcopyright license, permitting remix in any 
context and any quantity, and with automatic attribution of authorship.” 275  
Xanadu’s two way linking scheme, which would ensure that original works 
maintain a connection to quotations of them that appear elsewhere, undergirds 
Lanier’s idea for “humanistic computing,” an information infrastructure that tracks 
and values individuals’ contributions to networked resources, and disburses 
“nanopayments” accordingly. 276   Other proposals use doctrinal and political 
reforms to shape a more efficient information ecosystem.  William Fisher 
propounds the idea of a government funded reward system for entertainment media 
to facilitate public access to cultural products, which would compensate creators 
through revenue drawn from increased taxes, in lieu of exclusive economic 
rights.277  This Article cannot list, let alone evaluate, all such proposals, but they 
are a helpful contrast to its more modest suggestions. 
D. COPYRIGHT IS NO SILVER BULLET 
AI threatens to increase economic and social inequality in many ways.  
Copyright law, deployed judiciously, could mitigate some of these harms—but 
only a narrow subset of them.  While many expressive uses of AI may promote 
economic inequality, only some of them raise genuine copyright issues.  Negative 
social consequences of AI stem from a constellation of social and legal factors, and 
changes to copyright alone will not remedy all, or even most, of these 
consequences. 
1. Contracts 
A great deal of expressive machine learning can take place without copyright 
liability.  This is because companies often license training data from end users 
through broad terms of service.  These arrangements give a few powerful platforms 
access to immense stockpiles of data that can train and refine various forms of 
artificial intelligence.  If Google wanted to train the Smart Reply engine to write 
like David Foster Wallace, the company might have to license his oeuvre, but if 
Google were content with Smart Reply writing like every Gmail user, no additional 
licensing would be needed. 
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Expressive AI trained on data licensed by end user assent may present similar 
economic issues to AI trained on unauthorized copies of copyrighted works, but 
contracting conventions in cyberspace place these issues outside the scope of 
copyright law.  Bartering one’s personal information for gratis services may 
already be an unfair transaction for end users.  If it is the case that this AI will 
threaten individuals’ livelihoods more in the future than it does in the present 
moment, this transaction may become more unfair.278  In any event, as data driven 
AI flourishes, the standard form contract model for data collection may not be able 
to adjust to changes in the balance of the transaction.  Research suggests, for 
example, that too few users read terms of service to sustain an “informed minority” 
that polices platforms’ behavior to promote an efficient marketplace.279 
2. Algorithmic Bias 
The decision-making capabilities of a machine learning algorithm depend on its 
training data.  Biased data could lead an algorithm to perpetuate and reinforce those 
biases.  Some facial recognition algorithms perform better on whites than on 
minorities; a Nikon camera insists that its Asian-American owner is blinking due to 
the shape of her eyes; some algorithms used to predict risk of criminality may 
disproportionately disadvantage blacks.280  Easy access to less biased training data 
could mitigate these problems.  Insofar as copyright fetters this access, it does the 
public a disservice.  This rationale might suggest that limiting the availability of 
fair use for machine learning could have undesirable consequences for social 
justice, and therefore that this Article’s recommendations are unwise.  In fact, the 
relative inaccessibility of low-bias training data is a problem for which copyright is, 
at most, only partially responsible. 
First, although this Article’s analysis of fair use suggests that the doctrine should 
not excuse expressive, commercial machine learning, it would permit many uses 
motivated by social justice.  Issues of disparate impact in AI often pertain to the 
analysis of factual data and/or the output of purported facts—for example, the 
analysis of factual data about detainees or criminals and the output of purportedly 
factual risk scores, or the analysis of photographs and the output of purportedly 
factual identity matches.281  These uses do not implicate protected expression in 
source data.  Auditing data to determine the nature and extent of bias would be 
similarly non-expressive, because it matches factual outcomes with factual 
demographics.  Some biased applications of machine learning may be more 
expressive in character.  For example, machine translation can associate gender 
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with certain professions or traits as a result of biases in training data.  If engineers 
made unauthorized use of copyrighted data for the sole purpose of debiasing an 
expressive program, this Article’s formulation of fair use would excuse it.  But 
even if fair use were unavailable, altruistic engineers would not be out of luck.  
Bias issues of this kind may be ameliorated by mathematically transforming 
problematic models, rather than acquiring new data.282 
Second, there is little reason to believe that copyright liability deters the use of 
particular data in machine learning.  Recall a Google spokesperson’s response to its 
use of the BookCorpus dataset:  “The machine learning community has long 
published open research with these kinds of datasets, including many academic 
researchers with this set of free ebooks—it doesn’t harm the authors and is done for 
a very different purpose from the authors’, so it’s fair use under US law.”283  Little 
about the conduct of machine learning researchers or companies suggests an 
awareness of copyright liability, let alone any forbearance because of it. 
Third, even if suitably unbiased training datasets in fact exist, it is unlikely that 
an ungenerous fair use doctrine is the sole force keeping them out of circulation.  
Imagine, for argument’s sake, that the stock photography company Getty Images 
has a copyright protected repository of images that could be used to train less 
biased facial detection software, and that low resolution samples of these images 
are posted on Getty’s website for public viewing.  Even with an ironclad fair use 
defense, other statutes may outlaw the use of these photos to train AI.  Assembling 
the dataset could violate the anticircumvention provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 284  as well as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
which restricts unauthorized access to computers and has been described as a “para-
copyright tool to secure exclusivity to otherwise publicly accessible data.”285 
Finally, the most obvious obstacle to egalitarian machine learning is that the 
highest quality datasets are inaccessible not because of copyright law, but because 
of secrecy.  Data titans have little incentive to license their user data en masse to 
interested parties.  This is not surprising:  these companies’ troves of data are 
singularly valuable assets, and exclusive possession confers a distinct competitive 
advantage that in turn allows them access to more high quality data.286  Moreover, a 
company’s willingness to license user data to third parties might discourage privacy 
conscious individuals from using the service. 
CONCLUSION 
Advances in artificial intelligence and changes in the digital information 
economy have placed the fair use doctrine in crisis.  Today, economic dominance 
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belongs not to incumbent rights holders or exclusive licensees, but to the large 
internet platforms that use others’ data.  Machine learning technology empowers 
these companies to extract value from authors’ protected expression without 
authorization, and to use that value for commercial purposes that may someday 
jeopardize the livelihoods of human creators.  Construing fair use to protect this 
activity will place the doctrine at odds with the public interest and potentially 
exacerbate the social inequalities that AI threatens.  At the same time, finding that 
expressive machine learning is not fair use would frustrate the progress of the 
promising technology. 
The numerous challenges AI poses for the fair use doctrine are not, in 
themselves, reasons to despair.  Machine learning will realize immense social and 
financial benefits.  Its potency derives in large part from the creative work of real 
human beings.  The fair use crisis is a crisis precisely because copyright’s exclusive 
rights may now afford these human beings leverage that they otherwise would lack.  
The fair use dilemma is a genuine dilemma, but it offers an opportunity to promote 
social equity by reasserting the purpose of copyright law:  to foster the creation and 
dissemination of human expression by securing, to authors, the rights to the 
expressive value in their works. 
